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Is Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?
INTRODUCTION
Regulation Fair Disclosure! On its face, who could be opposed?' Fair
disclosure is intuitively appealing. Fairness is a core American value,
and disclosure is almost invariably seen as desirable. To some,
introducing Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation FD") was the
"crowning achievement" of Arthur Levitt,3 the longest serving Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").4 To the investor
community, it generated more interest than any previous regulation in
the history of the SEC.5
Arthur Levitt stated that "[tihe intent of Reg FD is really quite simple.
If a company wishes to pass on market-moving information, it must
share the news with everyone at the same time."6 Subject to certain safe-
harbors, Regulation FD requires a company that discloses "material non-
public" information to certain private audiences to also make that
information public. In this sense, if a company wishes to speak,
Regulation FD compels the company to speak publicly. If, however, the
company does not want to speak publicly, for example, if the
information is commercially sensitive, Regulation FD prevents the
company from speaking privately.
The SEC, citing several press reports, claimed that the practice of
selective disclosure is sufficiently widespread and harmful enough to
justify Regulation FD.7 Given the uncertainty surrounding the reach of
U.S. insider trading laws, Regulation FD "fill[s] a gap in an issuer's
disclosure duties that had been left open by the federal securities laws."'
The name was in fact chosen deliberately to try to reduce opposition to the
regulation. See ARTHUR LEVITr, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE
AMERICA DON'T WANT You To KNow. WHAT YOU CAN DO TO FIGHT BACK 93 (Pantheon
Books 2002) ("We purposely chose [the] name [Fair Disclosure] to make our opponents
think twice about fighting it.").
As Louis Brandeis put it about industrial diseases, "[slunlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat'l Home Library Ass'n 1933).
Farewell, Fair Disclosure?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 73.
Arthur Levitt, the 25th Chairman of the SEC, served from July 1993 to
February 2001. Chairman Arthur Levitt - SEC Biography, http://www.sec.gov/about
/commissioner/levitt.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,717 (Aug. 24, 2000).
6 LEVITr, supra note 1, at 88.
' Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 n.l (Dec. 28,
1999).
' Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP. L. 173, 208 (2004) (noting also
20051
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Unlike the insider trading laws, however, Regulation FD targets the
transmission of information, rather than the actual trading, if any, done
on the information.9 This, to put it mildly, was a "significant departure
from the U.S. disclosure regime as it existed over the past 65 years."10
Despite its disarming title, many people oppose Regulation FD.
Although small retail investors tend to support the Regulation," many
market professionals 2 and legal commentators 13 oppose it. Much of the
argument has revolved around whether Regulation FD is a good policy
choice. On one hand, supporters of the regulation argue that it will
increase confidence in the integrity of the markets.4 On the other hand,
that Regulation FD at least somewhat aligns U.S. laws with those of other jurisdictions).
' See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. Following the clarification included in
Rule lOb-5(1), possession of material nonpublic information, rather than use, is all that is
necessary. See infra note 481-83 and accompanying text.
10 Letter from Securities Industry Association to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 6,
2000), available at http:/ /ftp.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/spencerl.htm. The Securities
Industry Association is a trade association of more than 600 securities firms.
" Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,717 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(noting nearly 6000 comment letters on proposed rule of which "the vast majority ..
consisted of individual investors, who urged - almost uniformly - that we adopt
Regulation FD").
12 Id. "Market professionals" here refers both to the agents of large institutional
investors, such as hedge and mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and to
security industry professionals, such as analysts and lawyers. Arguably, market
professionals objected to the Regulation as they tended to be the beneficiaries of "unfair
disclosure," or in more balanced terms, selective disclosure. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
ratings agencies (Moody's, Standard & Poors, and Fitch) supported the Regulation once
they were granted an exemption from its bite. See infra Part I.A.2. As a later empirical
study showed, ratings agencies received a "strategic advantage" by becoming "privileged
conduits of selective disclosure to the public." Philippe Jorion et al., Informational Effects of
Regulation FD: Evidence from the Rating Agencies, 76 J. FIN. EcON. 309, 329 (May 2005).
13 See, e.g., Joanna E. Barnes, Regulation FD Will Result in Poorer Disclosure and Increased
Market Volatility, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 609 (2002); Brian K. Barry, The Securities and Exchange
Commission's Regulation Fair Disclosure: Parity of Information or Parody of Information?, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 645 (2002); Michael P. Daly & Robert A. Del Giorno, The SEC's New
Regulation FD: A Critical Analysis, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 457 (2002); Michael A.
Harrison, Regulation FD's Effect on Fixed-Income Investors: Is the Public Protected or Harmed?,
77 IND. L.J. 189 (2002); Scott Russell, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U. L. REv. 527 (2002); Andrea J.
Sessa, The Negative Consequences of Regulation FD on the Capital Markets, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 733 (2002); Peter Talosig III, Regulation FD - Fairly Disruptive? An Increase in Capital
Market Inefficiency, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 637 (2004).
1" Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000);
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks before the Directors' Education Institute at Duke
University: Staying the Course (Mar. 18,2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch031805smc.htm (quoting Letter from Business Roundtable to William
Donaldson, SEC Chairman (Mar. 2, 2005), in which Donaldson stated: "We also believe
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opponents generally argue that firms will respond by releasing a lower
quality and quantity of information, which will reduce market
efficiency." Surprisingly, however, few commentators argue against the
Regulation on free speech grounds." This article focuses on this
that Regulation FD has had the important and beneficial effect of enhancing investor
confidence in the marketplace."). Media commentators tended to support the regulation.
See, e.g., Bill Barnhart, Disclosure Rule Put Investors on Equal Footing, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 11, 2004,
at C5; Robert J. Schiller, Outlaw Selective Disclosure? Yes, Markets Must be Fair, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 10, 2000, at A18. Some companies also support Regulation FD. See, e.g., Expeditors
Int'l of Wash., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (July 24, 2003), available at
http:/ /www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/746515/000110465903015711 /a03-1427_18k.
htm ("Question: Do you think that spending time with sell-side analysts will tarnish your
reputation? [Answer:] We've made our reputation as freight forwarders so the only folks
we avoid are the competition. Much has been made lately of abuses on Wall Street and the
board rooms of Main Street .... What we have to say about analysts, we will say. For a
long time the rules rightly punished corporate insiders for any effort to profit from inside
information, while looking the other way and allowing the sell side free reign to traffic in it.
Honest analysis is valuable and we hope that the information put out in this forum gives
everyone an equal opportunity to predict what our future holds."). Some academics have
also supported the Regulation. See generally Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities
Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003) (arguing
in favor of Regulation FD as means of reducing agency costs).
"5 Opponents included industry associations, law firms, and media commentators.
Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (Apr. 28, 2000), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/sulcrom1.htm ("[Plarity of information
sought by the Commission may in fact become a parity of non-information (or perhaps
even misinf'ormation)."). See, e.g., SECURITIES INDUSTRIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE (2001); ASSOCIATION OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH, REGULATION FD E-SURVEY SUMMARY (2001), available at
http://www/cfainstitute.org/pressroom/pdf/OlRegFDtable.pdf; Lee Clifford, The SEC
Wants to Open the Info Vault: Regulation FD Sounds Great on Paper, but Will It Help Investors
Know More About the Companies They Own?, FORTUNE, Nov. 13, 2000, at 434; Daniel Gross, A
Little Democracy on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at A25 ("[Flull disclosure may
mean.., a stock market that is about as stable as an earthquake zone."); Kevin A. Hassett,
Outlaw Selective Disclosure? No, the More Information the Better, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2000, at
A18; Matt Krantz, Has Criticism Made Analysts Too Cautious?, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2003, at
lB. Some researchers produced models demonstrating that Regulation FD might stifle
firms' disclosure. See Anil Arya et al., Unintended Consequences of Regulating Disclosures: The
Case of Regulation Fair Disclosure, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 11 (2005). Occasionally,
opponents argued that more information would be disclosed, but much of it would be
nonmaterial and individual investors would find this difficult to interpret. See Laura S.
Unger, SEC Commissioner, Public Address: Rethinking Disclosure in the Information Age:
Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, (June 26, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm (noting negative effects of overabundant
information).
16 For exceptions see Nicholas Kappas, A Question Of Materiality: Why the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Regulation Fair Disclosure is Unconstitutionally Vague, 45 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 651 (2002); Larry Ribstein, SEC "Fair Disclosure" Rule is Constitutionally Suspect, 10
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL OPINION LETTER 17 (Oct. 6, 2000) ("Regulation FD .. .
demonstrates that the time has come to hold the SEC accountable under the First
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neglected question: the constitutionality of Regulation FD.17
Free speech under the First Amendment also is a core American value.
Although a corporation does not enjoy all of the same constitutional
rights as a natural person,"8 it does possess First Amendment rihts.19
These rights include protection of a corporation's commercial' ° and
political 2l speech and protection from being compelled to speak.22 The
level of protection, however, that the Supreme Court has provided for
laws affecting a corporation's speech varies greatly. Depending on the
nature of the regulation and of the regulated speech, the Court will apply
rational review,3 deferential intermediate scrutiny, biting intermediate• 24 2
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. 5
Determining the appropriate standard of review applicable to
Regulation FD is a difficult task.26 Regulation FD solely targets speech,
Amendment."); Letter from Joseph McLaughlin, Partner, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood
LLP, to Jonathan Katz, SEC Secretary, (June 30, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/mclaugh1.htm (discussing potential First
Amendment ramifications of Regulation).
17 Recently, there has been much greater media attention to this question, due to the
Siebel Systems, Inc. litigation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's high profile position on
the constitutionality of the Regulation. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Does the "Voice of Business"
Think the Bill of Rights Covers Insider Tips?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at Cl; Kathleen Pender,
Siebel Cites Free Speech in Challenging SEC Rule, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 2004, at Cl; Phyllis
Plitch, "Fair Disclosure" Inhibits Speech, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20,
2005, at C3; see infra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
18 See generally Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 664-67 (1990) (summarizing corporations' constitutional
rights).
19 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 765 (1978).
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
22 See, e.g., 435 U.S. at 784.
See, e.g., Dep't of Agric. v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001); Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
' See infra Part III.D.
2 See infra Part III.A.
' See infra Part III.B-C.
26 Some advocates argue that there is essentially a securities exemption, whereby the
First Amendment provides no protection for speech regulated by federal securities laws.
See Brief for Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 16-22,
SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2004) (No. 04 CV 5130), available at
2005 WL 2100269. Relying primarily on dicta in the Ohralik case, discussed infra at text
accompanying note 256-61, they argue that government can regulate the content of speech
in numerous circumstances without running afoul of the First Amendment. Id. at 18
(citations omitted). It is difficult to respond to each circumstance relied on in the brief,
since according to at least one commentator, all "currently available normative accounts"
of the First Amendment diverge substantially from its application. Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
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acting either to compel it to a public audience or to suppress it to a
private audience. Regulation FD focuses on the actual content of a
company's speech, which results in regulation of both less protected
28
commercial speech and fully protected noncommercial speech. The
harm addressed by Regulation FD is not the targeted speech itself, but
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787 (2004). In many of these circumstances, the speech merely evinces
the harmful conduct that the government seeks to prohibit, as in the case of sexual
harassment where the harassing speech adversely affects the terms and conditions of
employment. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that
Title VII prohibits abusive and discriminatory conduct that is so severe or pervasive as "to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment"). Regardless, such a sweeping First Amendment exemption for a securities
regulation that directly targets speech (particularly when the "harmful" conduct related to
the speech apparently remains lawful) requires more support than passing dicta in a case
that was decided in the infancy of the protection for corporate speech. Even the SEC itself
has acknowledged that, at least in some circumstances, securities regulation can raise
"serious questions" under the First Amendment. See Regulation of Communications
Among Shareholders, Release Nos. 34-31,326, IC-19031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992).
This, the SEC continued, "is especially true where such intrusion is not necessary to achieve
the goals of the federal securities laws." Id. (emphasis added). See Part IV.B for a
discussion of how targeting speech is not necessary to achieve the SEC's goals.
We acknowledge that there is some tension in applying the First Amendment to
Regulation FD without invalidating other securities regulations. First, we note that many
of the securities regulations that implicate speech also involve some closely related
conduct, such as those in the Securities Act of 1933 that require the sale of a security or in
the Williams Act that are associated with a shareholder vote or tender. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 7 c, e (2005); id. § 78n(d)-(e). Second, the purpose is often to prevent false or misleading
disclosure, which consistently allows the state to regulate speech. See infra note 392-98 and
accompanying text. Third, we note that the periodic reporting requirements, although
compelling speech, are based on the SEC's determination of the minimum amount of
information necessary "for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in
the security." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2004). In this
way, they are akin to other consumer protection regulations, such as those requiring
warning labels on pharmaceutical products or nutrition labels on food. See Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2005); Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 21
U.S.C. § 301 (2005). This contrasts with Regulation FD, which requires public disclosure
based only on (and thereby burdening) prior private disclosures - private disclosures
which have previously been found by the Supreme Court to be valuable. See Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983). In addition, periodic reporting only acts to compel, rather
than restrict, speech, and corporate compulsion is generally seen as less likely to violate the
First Amendment. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,87 (1980); Alan
Hirsch & Ralph Nader, "The Corporate Conscience" and Other First Amendment Follies in
Pacific Gas & Electric, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 483,484 (2004). Finally, one might argue that it
may be justifiable to uphold regulations that have been the settled law of the land for many
decades, while it is not justifiable to uphold recently passed regulations. Alternatively,
some commentators are willing to invalidate at least some securities regulations that
appear unlikely to meet intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 216-17.
27 See infra Part II.E.
See infra Part II.B.
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rather the trading that may or may not occur as a result of the speech.2
The curiosity is that Regulation FD directly "penalizes firms' truthful,
valuable disclosures. "30
Part I of this Article examines the reach of Regulation FD, the
enforcement actions to date, and the currently available empirical data.
Part II provides an introduction to the interaction between the First
Amendment and SEC regulations affecting speech. There are currently
no clear answers, since no court has yet reached the constitutional
question in addressing a regulation like FD. Part III broadens the
analysis in Part II to include regulations of commercial and mixed
commercial/noncommercial speech. Part III also examines the varying
treatment of compelled speech versus prohibited speech and applies
these lessons to Regulation FD in light of the clear trend toward greater
protection of corporate speech. Finally, Part IV analyzes the SEC's
justifications for Regulation FD and evaluates how effectively Regulation
FD achieves these goals. Regardless of whether a court applies strict
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny in its recent incarnations, this Article
argues that Regulation FD should not survive a First Amendment
challenge.
I. REGULATION FD
A. The Problem of Trading and Information Asymmetry
In the late 1990s, the SEC expressed concern over the trading in
securities following an issuer's selective disclosure of information.3'
Until that time, U.S. securities laws never required issuers to disclose all
If trading does occur, the trading and trader go unpunished under Regulation FD.
See infra Part I.A.
I Ribstein, supra note 16; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
51,716, 51,726 (Aug. 24, 2000) (stating that Regulation FD "is not an antifraud rule... [and]
a violation of Regulation FD is not an antifraud violation"); Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,594 (Dec. 28, 1999) ("The approach we propose
does not treat selective disclosure as a type of fraudulent conduct.").
"' See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 n.11 (Dec.
28, 1999) (listing newspaper articles); LEvrrr, supra note 1, at 93 ("'[S]elective disclosure'
had gotten out of hand in the 1990's .... That was wrong, plain and simple."); Thomas C.
Newkirk, Associate Director, & Melissa A. Robertson, Senior Counsel, SEC Division of
Enforcement, Remarks at the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime (Sept. 19,
1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm#
footbody-22 (stating that trading resulting from selective disclosure was "an area of special
concern to the Commission").
[Vol. 39:001
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material information,32  even though the SEC encouraged such
disclosure.3 ' Aside from a few required types of disclosures,3 companies
were free to disclose information as they saw fit.35 To be sure, an issuer
or its officers that bought or sold the issuer's own securities before
disclosing otherwise nonpublic material information would generally be
liable for insider trading. 6 Furthermore, in some circumstances, as
32 See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (Dec.
28, 1999); Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The
Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 679 (1999) (observing that U.S. securities
laws "do not create any standing rule or impose upon companies any general duty to
disclose to the public all material information whenever such information becomes
available to the company"). For example, SEC Rules 408 and 12b-20 are premised on the
absence of a general requirement to disclose all material information. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408,
240.12b-20 (2005).
See, e.g., Report of Investigation in the Matter of Sharon Steel Corporation as It
Relates to Prompt Public Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 18,271, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,049 (1981) (noting that "[t]he purpose of this Report is
to summarize the importance of timely disclosure by public corporations of material
developments in instances where it becomes apparent that persons may have access to non-
public corporate information and may take unfair advantage of the company's other
shareholders .... "). Also, the SEC has argued that the best practice is the prompt
disclosure of material information. See Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate
Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,733 (Oct. 15, 1970).
Issuers, other than foreign issuers, are required to promptly report on Form 8-K
certain material events, such as changes in control, resignation of directors, or events of
bankruptcy. See 17 C.F.R. § 228 (2005). As a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(1) (2005), the SEC recently adopted new rules that both increased the number
of items that must be reported and reduced the filing deadlines for most reportable events
to four business days. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration
of Filing Date, Release No. 34-49,424, 2004 WL 53681 (Mar. 16, 2004). The stock exchanges
also require prompt disclosure of some events. See, e.g., National Association of Security
Dealers, Rules 4310(c)(16), 4320(e)(14), and IM-4120-1 (2005), available at
http: //nasd.complinet.com/nasd /display/index.html (Disclosure of Material
Information); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual 202.05 (2005) (Timely Disclosure of
Material News Developments). Finally, in some narrowly drawn circumstances there is a
duty to update or a duty to amend. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3dCir. 1997).
" See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28,
1999) ("[Tlhe issuer determines how and to whom to make its initial disclosure."). There
are several obvious reasons why a company would not want to promptly disclose all
material events. For example, as in Texas Gulf Sulphur, a mining company that finds rich
deposits in a particular area may not want to disclose this fact prior to purchasing mineral
rights in the nearby land. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
Such trading fits within the common law notion of fraud and is thus easily captured
by the key U.S. insider trading rule, Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See, e.g., Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (holding that corporation's director who bought corporation's
stock knowing it was going to increase in value without disclosing his knowledge to
outside seller had committed fraud). For a discussion of the economic harm of insider
trading, see generally, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost:
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discussed below, if the issuer disclosed such information to third parties
who then traded in the issuer's securities, the third party would also be
liable for insider trading. Trading resulting from selective disclosure,
however, is not always actionable insider trading.
The problem resulted from a quirk of securities law. Most restrictions
on insider trading evolved from Section 10b of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193437 and Rule 10b-5, the antifraud provision thereunder." As
the Supreme Court put it, "we deal with a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn." 39 Rule 10b-5 simply prohibits
fraudulent conduct. 40 Nonetheless, lower courts initially understood
Rule 10b-5 to also prohibit trading that resulted from the selective
disclosure of inside information.4'
When the insider trading cases reached the Supreme Court, however,
the Court held that Congress had not authorized an "absolute equal
information rule."42 Therefore, courts could only impose liability on a
trader who had a duty to disclose. 43 Thus, when the SEC tried to prevent
a form of trading based on selective disclosure in Dirks v. SEC,44 the
A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN.
L. REV. 1 (1993).
3, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). The remaining U.S. federal prohibitions are sections 16
and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p, 78n(e) (2005); Rule 14e-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2005); The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376,
98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered subdivisions of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2005)); and
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered subdivisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78, 80b-4a
(2005)).
'9 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (adding "it would
be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.").
4' Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful for any person in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, states "(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a [necessary] material fact,
or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or
deceit on any person." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
" See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA.
L. REv. 1023, 1027 n.11 (1990) (citing three pre-Chiarella cases).
" Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.16 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
231-32 (1980) (rejecting notion that federal securities laws were intended to provide equal
access to all information).
" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231.
' Dirks was a broker dealer who received material nonpublic information from a
former officer of Equity Funding America. Dirks subsequently investigated and confirmed
the information and discussed it with clients and investors, some of whom subsequently
sold their Equity Funding securities. During his investigation, Dirks also urged the Wall
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Court limited insider trading to those cases in which the trader received
the information "improperly."4  "Improperly" meant that the
information was conveyed in breach of the tipper's fiduciary duty.4 In
the case of selective disclosure, the trader could only be liable if a direct
or indirect Xersonal benefit to the tipper motivated the tipper's selective
disclosure. The selective disclosure targeted by Regulation FD,
however, generally does not involve such a personal benefit. Rather, the
benefit in question is to the corporation.4 Therefore, Regulation FD can
be seen as an end-run around the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
Dirks and other cases such as Chiarella.49
Regulation FD, where "FD" stands for "fair disclosure," became
effective on October 23, 2000. ° Regulation FD provides:
Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities
to any [enumerated] person . . . the issuer shall make public
Street Journal to report the information. Meanwhile, the stock price dropped 42%. The SEC
censured Dirks, and this censure was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the "idea that the antifraud provisions require equal
information among all traders." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646-52, 657.
s Id. at 660; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud (under § 10(b)) absent a duty to speak. We hold
that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information."). Interestingly, the Chiarella Court of Appeals had held that "[ainyone
- corporate insider or not - who regularly receives material nonpublic information may
not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to
disclose." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-61.
" Id. at 662 ("Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of
duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach and
thus no breach of Rule lOb-5."). Financial gain or a reputational benefit that will result in a
financial gain are examples of direct or indirect personal benefits. See id. at 663. The SEC
has settled at least one enforcement action that hinged on the tipper receiving a
reputational benefit. SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release 12,813, 1991 WL 296537 (Mar. 19,
1991). Since the case was settled, no court had occasion to rule on the theory. There do not
appear to be any subsequent cases applying this theory.
" It seems as though there might also be at least an attenuated personal benefit if, for
example, the tipper is also a stock or option holder; but there do not appear to have been
cases which so hold.
'9 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593-94 (Dec. 28,
1999) (acknowledging need for and use of legal approach in Regulation FD different from
that used for insider trading); Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan Katz, Secretary,
SEC, supra note 15 ("[T]he Commission is, we believe, attempting to rewrite the laws of
insider trading.").
0 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
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disclosure of that information... : (1) Simultaneously, in the case of
an intentional disclosure; and (2) Promptly, in the case of a non-
intentional disclosure.5'
The key terms of the regulation require further explanation.
1. Who Is Covered?
Regulation FD applies to "issuers," which are essentially all reporting
companies, 52 including closed-end investment companies, but excluding
all other types of investment companies. Regulation FD, at least "at this
time," 54 does not cover foreign governments and foreign private issuers."
Foreign private issuers, however, are highly significant. There are over
1250 foreign companies registered and reporting with the SEC.56 At the
end of 2003, the New York Stock Exchange had nearly 3,000 listings of
which 500, approximately 16%, were from outside the United States. 7
During 2003, investors traded over $729 billion worth of foreign stock on
volume of roughly 35 billion shares on the NYSE. 8
17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2005).
" The Securities Exchange Act requires certain issuers, such as those listed on a
national securities exchange or those with assets of over $10 million and a non-exempt
security held by over 500 shareholders, to comply with the SEC's periodic information
disclosure requirements. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 781(b), 781(g) (2002).
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2005).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,724 (Aug. 24, 2000).
s The SEC has always treated foreign governments gingerly, as they are sovereign
entities. Foreign private issuers are often treated differently, in part because they face their
own domestic rules that may be inconsistent with U.S. rules. For an interesting discussion
supporting the SEC's decision to exempt foreign private issuers, see Merritt B. Fox,
Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
653 (2001) (arguing also that Regulation FD is undesirable). For the opposite perspective,
see William K. S. Wang, Selective Disclosure By Issuers, Its Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some
Observations in Response to Professor Fox, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 869 (2002).
See Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/intemnatl
/geographic.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
"' See NYSEdata.com, All NYSE Listed Stocks (Annual), http://www.nysedata.
com/factbook/vieweredition.asp?mode=table&key=2217&category=14 (last visited Oct.
17, 2005); NYSEdata.com, Geographic Breakdown of Stocks of Non-U.S. Corporate Issuers
2003, available at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/viewer -edition.asp?mode=table&
key=2906&category=6 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). See also NASDAQ, NASDAQ
International Companies, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (listing foreign companies trading on NASDAQ, equal to
approximately 10% of the total).
I See NYSEdata.com, All NYSE Listed Stocks, supra note 57; NYSEdata.com,
Geographic Breakdown of Stocks of Non-U.S. Corporate Issuers 2003, supra note 57.
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Regulation FD also applies to people acting on behalf of the issuer.
This category, however, includes only the issuer's senior officials and
anyone who "regularly communicates" with market professionals or the
issuer's investors. 9 A person does not act on the issuer's behalf if she
breaches a duty of trust or confidence owed to the issuer.6°
2. Who Are the Enumerated Persons?
Regulation FD only covers disclosures to certain kinds of persons - in
theory, "those who would reasonably be expected to trade securities on
the basis of the information or provide others with advice about
securities trading." 61  Most of these persons are securities market
62professionals: brokers and dealers and their associates, investment
advisers and managers and their associates," and investment companies
and their affiliates. The other kind of person covered is "a holder of the
issuer's securities," but only "under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer's
securities on the basis of the information." 65  The SEC deliberately
excluded disclosures to the media, government agencies, and persons in
the ordinary course of business, such as vendors, customers, or strategic
partners."
Even when the disclosure is made to an enumerated person,
Regulation FD still will not apply as long as that person either already
owed a duty of confidentiali 7 to the issuer or expressly agreed to keep
the information confidential. Regulation FD does not need to cover
such disclosures because the existing insider trading regime, under
either a "temporary insider"68 relationship or "misappropriation
17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2005).
6 Id.
61 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,719 (Aug. 24, 2000).
62 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i) (2005).
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii) (2005).
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii) (2005).
17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2005).
66 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,720 (Aug. 24, 2000).
Presumably for evidentiary reasons, Regulation FD does not apply to people who are
considering becoming security holders.
6 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i) (2005).
A temporary insider is an outsider, such as a lawyer or accountant, who has
received corporate information because of her "special confidential relationship" with the
issuer. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
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theory,"69 already applies to any resulting trades. Regulation FD also
provides an exception for disclosures to ratings agencies and "in
connection with [most] securities offering[s] registered under the
Securities Act.70
3. What Information Is Covered?
a. Material Information
Regulation FD applies only to the disclosure of "material non-public
information." Rather than attempt in the release to define (or redefine)
the key term in the phrase, "material," the SEC relied on the pre-existing
definition set forth by the Supreme Court.71 "Information is material if
'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important' in making an investment decision." There must
also be a substantial likelihood that the reasonable investor would view
the information "as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available." 73  A bright-line rule defining materiality
was not possible, because "[w]hat is material depends on the unique
facts and circumstances of each company. " 74 More candidly, a bright-
69 In U.S. v. O'Hagan, the Supreme Court finally endorsed the misappropriation theory
of insider trading. 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). The Court had previously divided evenly on
the theory in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), and declined to decide it in
Chiarella v. United States because the theory had not been presented to the jury. 445 U.S.
222, 235-37 (1980). Under the misappropriation theory, a trader can be found guilty of
violating Rule lOb-5 if the trader owes a duty to the source of the confidential information
upon which she bases her trade. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 ("[Tlhe misappropriation theory
premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with
access to confidential information.").
- 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iv) (2005). The SEC apparently exempted securities
offerings, where traditionally much information that is not in the issuers' prospectus is
made available orally in the "road shows" to big investors, because it intended to address
the issue in greater detail. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,725 (Aug. 24, 2000). The SEC's proposed rules on securities offerings were not issued
until late in 2004. See Securities Offering Reform, Release Nos. 33-8501, 34-50,624,
IC-26,649, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392 (Nov. 17, 2004).
71 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000).
Id. at 51,721 (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976));
see also In re Raytheon & Franklyn A. Caine, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,897,
§ I(D), 2002 WL 31643026 (Nov. 25, 2002) (citing Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32
(1988)).
" Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976)).
74 LEVrIT, supra note 1, at 89.
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line rule also was not possible because the Supreme Court had already
ruled against that approach.75
Materiality has both a quantitative and a qualitative component.76
Quantitatively, some issuers used 5% as a rule of thumb for materiality
disclosures; the SEC, however, rejected this approach. 7 "[M]agnitude by
itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the circumstances in
which the judgment has to be made, will not generally be a sufficient
basis for a materiality judgment."78
The qualitative aspect is perhaps best illustrated by the statement of
David B.H. Martin, the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance,
that "a reasonable investor would likely consider it significant that a
foreign company raising capital in the U.S. markets has business
relationships with countries, governments or entities" facing certain
types of U.S. economic sanctions. 79 Such business relationships need not
necessarily be important to the company. Rather, they might become
material because of public opposition to the business relationships.8 The
qualitative aspect of materiality may also be illustrated by the SEC's
current exploration of whether a film studio that prescreened a movie to
' See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) ("Any approach that designates a
single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact specific finding such
as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.").
76 See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99,64 Fed. Reg. 45,150,45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999).
'7 Id.
Id. at 45,152.
' Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance,
SEC, to Laura Unger, Acting Chair, SEC (May 8, 2001), attachment to Letter from Laura S.
Unger, Acting Chair, SEC, to Congressman Frank P. Wolf (May 8, 2001), available at 2001
SEC No-Act, LEXIS 579. Congress has since directed the SEC to establish an Office of
Global Security Risk that would require every U.S.-listed company to disclose any
involvement, "no matter how large or small," in designated terrorist sponsoring states.
H.R. REP. No. 108-221 (2004). This requirement is based on the asymmetric nature of the
risk to corporate share value and reputation. Id. See generally, Cynthia A. Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197,
1273-89 (1999) (arguing that SEC should require "corporate social disclosure," including
such information "as what products a company sells, in what countries it does business, its
employment and environmental records, (both domestic and global), and specified
information about a company's community and political effects in the United States and
elsewhere"); Note, Should The SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1433 (2002) ("[A]s a normative matter, mandatory disclosure of socially relevant
data - even financially immaterial data - would be desirable under certain circumstances
'0 One law firm went so far as to suggest that foreign issuers may need to disclose
activities that "would not be prohibited even for a U.S. company." Shearman & Sterling
Client Publication, Activities in Sanctioned Countries - New SEC Scrutiny (June 8, 2001) (on
file with authors).
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analysts had selectively disclosed material information in violation of
Regulation FD.8'
Recognizing the difficulty of materiality determinations, the SEC
produced a nonexclusive list for Regulation FD purposes, while
cautioning that a bright-line standard would be inadequate:
[T]he following items are some types of information or events that
should be reviewed carefully to determine whether they are
material: (1) earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender
offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or
discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g.,
the acquisition or loss of a contract); (4) changes in control or in
management; (5) change in auditors or auditor notification that the
issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's audit report; (6) events
regarding the issuer's securities - e.g., defaults on senior securities,
calls of securities for redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or
changes in dividends, changes to the rights of security holders,
public or private sales of additional securities; and (7) bankruptcies
81
or receiverships.
The SEC also added that subdividing information into multiple,
smaller pieces would not save the overall disclosure from Regulation
FD's reach. It simultaneously noted that Regulation FD would not reach
a situation where the recipient of the information pieces together smaller
bits of information into something material without the issuer's
knowledge.8 Here, the SEC attempted to encourage investors and
securities market professionals to continue (or at least not discourage
them from continuing) the difficult work of analyzing company
performance.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court previously set forth
these definitions of materiality,4 the definitions were perhaps the most
controversial part of Regulation FD. Many commentators criticized the
8 See Merissa Marr, Pixar Faces Informal SEC Probe Related to Disclosure of Results, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 26, 2005, at A3.
82 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000).
Item number three, in particular, is unhelpful, as it includes a very broad range of
activities. The speech at issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), is along these lines,
in that it addresses working conditions in factories that supply Nike. See infra notes 335-44
and accompanying text.
83 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721. This is known
as the mosaic theory.
" See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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materiality standard on the grounds that it was too vague.85
b. Nonpublic Information
The meaning of "nonpublic" raises fewer concerns than the definition
of "materiality". The SEC, again relying on case law, defined
"nonpublic" as information that "has not been disseminated in a manner
making it available to investors generally."86  It remains unclear,
however, whether the SEC considers information to be public if the
market knows of the information or only if the company itself discloses
17the information. Making information public, given the widespread use
of the Internet, is straightforward.5 In particular, the SEC will consider
the disclosure public if it occurs at a meeting that is webcast, that the
public can call into,89 or at a meeting of shareholders. 90
' Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000).
At least one academic commentator reached the same conclusion. See Kappas, supra note
16, passim; see also Joan Macleod Hemingway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider
Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2003) (arguing that all parties
"would benefit from additional guidance in making materiality determinations in the
insider trading context"). Although we agree that more guidance would be desirable, we
are not convinced that the long-established judicial definition of materiality, based as it is
on the views of a reasonable investor, poses any vagueness difficulties significantly greater
than in other First Amendment contexts.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (citing SEC v.
Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968)). Texas Gulf Sulphur is one of the seminal
cases in U.S. insider trading, as it was the first federal court decision to find a violation
under Rule 10b-5. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 864; see also, In re Raytheon Co.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,897, § IV A&B, 2002 WL 31623026 (Nov. 25,
2002).
' To date, none of the enforcement actions address this point. The better answer is
that if the market is aware of the information, its nonrelease is immaterial. See Wielgos v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "knowledge
abroad in the market" may reduce or eliminate any misleading nature of nondisclosure);
see also Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding omission
immaterial because it had been reported nationwide).
' The issuer must either furnish or file a Form 8-K or alternatively, "[disseminate] the
information through another method (or combination of methods) of disclosure that is
reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to
the public." 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2005). In practice, few well-advised companies would
file rather than furnish the 8-K, as furnishing an 8-K prevents liability under Section 11 of
the Securities Act and Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act.
" Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,723 (Aug. 24, 2000).
' SEC, Div. OF CORP. FINANCE, MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE TELEPHONE
INTERPRETATIONS (4th Supp. Oct. 2000), available at http: //www.sec.gov/interps/telephone
/phonesupplement4.htm.
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c. Reckless or Knowing Mental State
In addition to the requirement that the information be material and
nonpublic, the SEC also added a definition of "intentional" in order to
lessen the potential sting of Regulation FD. Under this requirement, a
person must know or be reckless in not knowing that the disclosed
information is both material and nonpublic. 91 The standard is not
whether a proverbial reasonable person would have known that the
information was material and nonpublic, but whether any reasonable
person would have thought that the information was not material or
92public. Thus, there is no liability for merely negligent behavior.
4. What Is Required Under Regulation FD?
Regulation FD requires that issuers who intentionally or recklessly
disclose material nonpublic information privately to any enumerated
persons must simultaneously disclose the information publicly.93 In the
case of nonintentional disclosure, the issuer must "promptly" disclose
the information publicly as soon as the issuer's senior official knows, or
is reckless in not knowing of the disclosure.9 4 "Promptly" means "as
soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 hours
or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
Exchange) .... "9-9
B. Application
The SEC's enforcement actions over the last four years have helped
flesh out Regulation FD's meaning. Since Regulation FD became
effective, the SEC has brought seven enforcement actions.96 Five of these
91 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2005).
92 See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted) (defining reckless conduct "as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care," and adding that it must be "so obvious that any reasonable
man would be legally bound as knowing"). The SEC endorsed the Hollinger court's
approach. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,722 (Aug.
24, 2000).
" 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1) (2005).
- 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2005).
95 Id.
" The SEC also appears to have commenced several informal inquiries. See, e.g.,
Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Form 8-K) (Dec. 22, 2003), available at
http: / / www.sec.gov/ Archives/edgar/ data /881464 / 000110465903029039 /0001104659-03-
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actions resulted in settlements, one resulted in a report of investigation,
and one was recently dismissed at the district court level, although the
SEC may yet appeal.
1. Guiding Analysts to More Accurate Earnings Estimates
On November 25, 2002, in one of four initial enforcement actions
initiated by the SEC, Raytheon and Raytheon's Chief Financial Officer
agreed to a public cease and desist order.98 Neither respondent,
however, admitted guilt for violating Regulation FD.99 The action arose
from statements made during a webcast investor conference, in which
Raytheon confirmed its expected annual earnings but did not disclose its
expected quarterly earnings.'0°  Afterwards, Raytheon's CFO
individually called twelve sell-side analysts to tell them, among other
things, that their quarterly earnings and revenue estimates were "too
high," "aggressive," or "very aggressive."10' The analysts then lowered
their estimates by an average of five cents per share, and at least some of
102them discussed these estimates with their firms' sales forces. In
contrast, analysts who did not receive the selective disclosure did not
029039-index.htm (announcing SEC was "conducting an informal inquiry related to recent
communications [about its diabetic drug] .... The Company believes that this inquiry
relates to compliance with Regulation FD."); see Marr, supra note 81 (reporting informal
inquiries into Pixar Animation Studios and DreamWorks Animation SKG); Terri Somers,
SEC Opens Inquiry into Amylin Conference Call, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Dec. 20, 2003, at C3.
" See SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.) (dismissing
complaint); In re Flowserve Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-51,427, § I n.1,
2005 WL 677810 (Mar. 24, 2005) (settling case after defendants agreed to pay specified
fines); In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,461, § I, 2003 WL
22082153 (Sept. 9, 2003) (settling case under cease and desist order); In re Raytheon Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,897, § IV A&B, 2002 WL 31623026 (Nov. 25, 2002)
(resulting in cease and desist order); In re Secure Computing Corp., Exchange Act Release
No. 34-46,895, § II, 2002 WL 31643024 (Nov. 25, 2002) (ending in settlement where parties
agreed to cease and desist order); In re Siebel Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,896
(Nov. 25, 2002) (settling case using cease and desist order without admission of guilt);
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,898, §1, 2002 WL 31650174 (Nov. 25, 2002)
(reporting results of investigation but without prosecuting).
" Raytheon and Caine each agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing
"any violations and any future violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act or
Regulation FD." In re Raytheon Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,897, § IV A&B, 2002
WL 31623026 (Nov. 25, 2002).
- Id. § I.
1w Id.
101 Id. § 11(A).
902 Id. § III(C).
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reduce their quarterly estimates. 10 3 The Raytheon action illustrated that
the SEC would not permit companies to selectively guide analysts to
more accurate forecasts.
2. Disclosing Material Contracts
In the second of the four initial cases, Secure Computing Corporation
and its CEO also agreed to a cease and desist order without admitting
guilt.1' 4 The CEO nonintentionally informed several securities market
professionals that Secure Computing had obtained a contract with a
distributor for the sale of its Internet security product.' The following
day, the CEO selectively disclosed the information again, but this time it
was intentional because he had learned that it was material nonpublic
information. °6 Although information about the deal was posted on
Secure Computing's website, the company had not publicly announced
the deal and did not do so until after the market closed the following
day. 1 7 Meanwhile, the volume of trades and the price of the stock
increased significantly.'08 This enforcement action illustrated the point
that information may remain nonpublic, even if it is publicly available.
3. General Business Trends
In the third of the four initial cases, Siebel Systems, Inc., concurrently
agreed to a cease and desist order without admitting guilt 1°9 and a
$250,000 civil penalty."0 On November 5, 2001, Siebel's CEO, addressing
an invitation-only technology conference, gave participants optimistic
information regarding the company's expected sales and the overall
business environment."' This statement came only nineteen days after
103 Id.
'o In re Secure Computing Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,895, § II 2002
WL 31643024 (Nov. 25, 2002).
103 Id. § III(D). The disclosure was nonintentional because the CEO apparently believed
that information on the company's website rendered it public information. Id.
106 Id.
17 Id. § III(F). Part of the problem was that the contract included a provision requiring
that the other party consent before a public announcement. Id. § III(C).
108 Id. § III(F).
10 In re Siebel Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,896 (Nov. 25, 2002).
.. In the Matter of Siebel Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,896, Litigation Release
17,860, 2002 WL 31643062 (Nov. 25, 2002).
.. In re Siebel Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,896, § III(B)(4) (Nov. 25, 2002).
[T]he business decisions appear to be quite normal right now, and so we're
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the CEO's previous statement on a public conference call that since
September 11, 2001, the market had been and would continue to be
"quite tough."112  Siebel's stock price had dropped 19% after the
conference call, but increased 16.5% during and after the technology
conference."' Participants in the conference were among the buyers in
the post-conference stock price increase, 4  and they included
enumerated persons, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers.
The SEC determined that the disclosures were intentional because the
CEO allegedly knew that the information he disclosed was material and
had not previously been made public."' Furthermore, Siebel's Investor
Relations Director knew that the technology conference was not open to
116the public. Clearly, issuers cannot selectively reverse their previous
predictions.
4. Quantitatively Defining Qualitative Terms
In the final case of the initial four, the SEC reported the results of an
investigation of Motorola, Inc., regarding an alleged Regulation FD
violation. 17 On February 23, 2001, Motorola publicly disclosed that it
pretty optimistic about what we're seeing at this time. People are engaging...
[in] ... software selection,.. .contracts are getting signed .... they're expanding
their existing previous appointments, so right now it appears we're seeing a
return to normal behavior in IT buying patterns .... [Tihe behavior of the
market appears normal .... Right now, it appears to be, the processes appear to
be back to more of a normal rate. It's not, it's not a depressed rate. .. as deals are
moving through the pipeline .... I mean if we had seen continued geo-political
dislocation, it could have been a nightmare out there in Q4. The good news is
we're not seeing that. So, that's, that is a relief for everybody.
Id.
112 Id. § III(B)(2). The CEO's remarks included, "Since September 11, we have faced an
... environment for information technology that has been as difficult as any in the history
of the information technology industry. Things have been tough. We think that they will
continue to be quite tough in the short term. We have an exceptionally soft market for
information technology .... Spending for tech products and services continues to slide.
We expect things will be quite tough through the remainder of the year." Id.
113 Id.
Id. § III(B)(6).
", Id. § III(B)(7).
11 Id. § III(B)(1). Presumably the SEC could not show that Siebel's CEO was aware that
the conference was not public, and thus, he was not charged, unlike Secure Computing's
CEO or Raytheon's CFO.
117 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,898, § I, 2002 WL 31650174 (Nov. 25,
2002).
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suffered "significant weakness" in its sales and orders."' From March 6
to 12, 2001, Motorola's Director of Investor Relations disclosed in one-on-
one telephone calls with approximately fifteen sell-side analysts that
"significant" meant that sales and orders would be at least 25% lower
than expected. 9 The SEC, however, chose not to take enforcement
action because the Director of Investor Relations consulted with in-house
counsel prior to speaking with the analysts.2 ' The in-house lawyer
determined that this definition of "significant" was neither material nor
nonpublic, believing instead that "significant," "very large," and "25% or
more" all conveyed the same thing.'2 1 Although the SEC disagreed,
stating that the disclosed information was "clearly" material,' 22 it
recognized that, given this good faith attempt at compliance,
punishment was unwarranted. The SEC cautioned, however, that
having in this case refrained from a formal enforcement action, it "would
be less likely in future cases to credit reliance on counsel for the advice
rendered here." 123 Issuers were thus put on notice that they could not
selectively disclose quantitative definitions of qualitative terms.
5. Tone, Emphasis, and Demeanor
On September 9, 2003, the SEC announced the agreement of Schering-
Plough and its former CEO, Richard. Kogan, to a cease and desist order
and to $1 million and $50,000 in civil penalties, respectively.1' 5 Neither
Schering-Plough nor Kogan admitted guilt.126 On September 30 and
October 1, 2002, Kogan and another Schering executive met individually
127with four institutional analysts. At each meeting, Kogan conveyed
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
12 Id. § III(1). According to the SEC, Motorola's in-house legal counsel "responsible for
SEC reporting and disclosure issues" advised that it was acceptable to "provide
quantitative definitions for certain qualitative terms that had been used in the February 23
announcements." Id. § II(D).
" Id. § II. The SEC noted that the fact that the Director of Investor Relations wanted to
call the analysts to define significant belied the contention that the information conveyed
was nothing new. Id.
Id. § 111(5).
12. In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,461, § I, 2003
WL 22082153 (Sept. 9,2003).
" SEC Files Settled Regulation FD Charges Against Schering-Plough Corp. and Its
Former Chief Executive, Litigation Release No. 18,330, 81 SEC Docket 153 (Sept. 9, 2003).
126 Id.
12 In re Schering-Plough, supra note 124, § III(A).
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more negative information than previously disclosed to the public
"through a combination of spoken language, tone, emphasis, and
demeanor" about Schering's prospects.' 28 Schering's stock price declined
more than 17% on four times the typical volume, largely due to sales by
the institutions who met with Kogan.'29  In addition, two of the four
institutional analysts downgraded their ratings of Schering. On October
3, 2002, Schering finally issued a press release confirming what Kogan
previously saidi3 After this enforcement action, issuers learned that
maintaining a poker face might be necessary to avoid Regulation FD
liability.
6. Confirming Prior Guidance
More recently, on March 24, 2005, Flowserve Corporation and its CEO,
C. Scott Greer, agreed to pay $350,000 and $50,000, respectively, in
connection with privately confirming prior earnings guidance in
response to questioning by analysts from investment and brokerage
firms.3  Flowserve's written disclosure policy, however, stated that
earnings guidance was effective as of the date given and the company
would only update it publicly. 32  After one of the analysts issued a
' Id. The SEC does not conclude whether the disclosure was intentional or
nonintentional. The release simply states:
Although Kogan's purpose may not have been to suggest that institutional
investors sell Schering stock, his conduct failed to meet the requirements of
Regulation FD. Kogan's statements, demeanor and general expressions of
concern for Schering's prospects during private meetings amounted to selective
disclosure and prompted a significant sell-off in Schering stock.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added). This possibly unintentional demeanor evidence in the Schering
action goes beyond the deliberate use of body language to convey information that had
been mentioned in the Motorola investigation. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motorola, Inc., supra note 117, at 4
(stating that "[i]ssuers may not evade the public disclosure requirements of Regulation FD
by using 'code' words or 'winks and nods"').
' In re Schering-Plough, supra note 124, § III(C)(D)(4).
,30 Id. § III(C)(D)(5).
In re Flowserve Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-51,427, § I n.1, 2005 WL 677810
(Mar. 24, 2005).
13 Id. § III(C) (stating that Flowserve representatives must respond to questions by
saying: "Although business conditions are subject to change, in accordance with
Flowserve's policy, the current earnings guidance was effective at the date given and is not
being updated until the company publicly announces updated guidance."). Presumably
such a policy would not be necessary to find liability under Regulation FD, if, for example,
the market no longer believes a company's estimates.
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report noting the confirmation of the earnings guidance, Flowserve's
stock price rose 6% on 75% greater than usual volume.13
The first Regulation FD enforcement action actually litigated was SEC
v. Siebel Systems, Inc.M Even in its preliminary stages, the case generated
national attention.9' The SEC's complaint alleged that Siebel's CFO,
Kenneth Goldman, and a Siebel Senior Vice President, Mark Hanson,
knowingly or recklessly disclosed information at a one-on-one meeting
with an institutional investor and at a dinner hosted by an investment
bank.'36 In addition, the complaint alleged that they knowingly or
recklessly failed to promptly and publicly disclose the information.37
The SEC charged them with a violation not only of Regulation FD, but
also of the previously issued cease and desist order.'- At both the dinner
and the meeting, Goldman allegedly made positive comments regarding
overall business levels and the transaction pipeline, which conflicted
with previously released negative public comments. Following the two
events, Siebel's stock price increased by 8%139 and several participants in
these events purchased stock.14 In addition, rumors of the company's
optimism spread in the market.
1 41
On September 1, 2005, the district court granted Siebel's motion to
dismiss the SEC's lawsuit on the grounds that the "nature and content of
the statements that the SEC alleges violated Regulation FD do not
support the Commission's claim that Siebel Systems or its senior officials
' Id. § III(B).
SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem).
13' Both the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and a group of 24 securities law
professors filed amici briefs, albeit on opposite sides of the constitutional issues. See Brief
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Motion
to Dismiss, SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 CV 5130),
available at http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/briefsrtoz.htm; Brief of Law
Professors as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, SEC v. Siebel Sys.,
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 CV 5130) (on file with authors); Phyllis Plitch, Law Professors Back
Reg FD, Take SEC Side vs. Challenge, SMART MONEY, Mar. 11, 2005, at
http://www.smartmoney.com/news/on/index.cfm?story=ON-20050311-001015-2046; see
also Ann Woolner, Disclosure Case May Clarify Rule; Court Challenge - Favored Few Got
Company News; Did It Violate SEC Rule?, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at E5; Siebel Claims
SEC Rule Violates Free Speech, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 2004, at C4; sources cited, supra note 16.
" SEC Complaint at 1, 3, SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04
CV 5130), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/r18766.htm.
Id. at 3.
" See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
'9 See SEC Complaint, supra note 136, at 15.
Id. at 13, 15.
Id. at 15.
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privately disclosed material nonpublic information. " ' 42 In his decision,
Judge George Daniels criticized the SEC for "scrutiniz[ing] at an
extremely heightened level, every particular word used in the statement,
including the tense of verbs and the general syntax of each sentence." 143
Company executives and spokespersons could not be expected to
become "linguistic experts, or otherwise live in fear of violating
Regulation FD" based on SEC "nitpicking."' 44 The court also noted that a
recipient's view of information as significant and presumably the action
of trading on the information, by itself, was insufficient to show that the
information was material 45
Although the court did not expressly reach the constitutional issue, the
decision is in fact "classic constitutional avoidance." '46  Professor
Kathleen Sullivan, in arguing the case before Judge Daniels, stressed that
Regulation FD should be construed narrowly, and that if so construed,
the court need not address the Regulation's facial validity and its serious
First Amendment problems. 47 The decision is thus best read as taking
account of the First Amendment argument (in particular, the
Regulation's potential chilling effect on corporate speech), 14 albeit
through inter retation of Regulation FD rather than through facial
invalidation. 4  The SEC has not yet announced whether it will appeal
the district court's decision.
Given the "literally tens of thousands of 'one-on-one' meetings"
between issuers and securities market professionals,50 the relatively few
enforcement actions may mean that (a) issuers are complying with
Regulation FD, (b) detection is difficult (since both parties have an
142 SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.).
'' Id. at 704.
144 Id.
,4 Id. at 704.
146 Telephone Conversation with Kathleen Sullivan, Stanley Morrison Professor of Law
and Former Dean Stanford Law School, in Palo Alto, CA (Sept. 2, 2005). We are grateful to
Professor Sullivan for first bringing this analysis to our attention.
I47 Id.
14 See, e.g., SEC v. Siebel Systems, 384 F. Supp. 2d. 694, 700-03, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(mem.) (emphasizing throughout opinion possibility that Regulation FD could chill
corporate speech).
49 Telephone Conversation with Kathleen Sullivan, supra note 146.
" See Louis M. Thompson, Jr., SEC Cites Investor Relations Officer for Failure to
Maintain Proper Disclosure Controls to Avoid Violations of Regulation, National
Investor Relations Institute's Executive Alert (July 7, 2004),
http://www.niri.org/irresource-pubs/alerts/ea20040707.cfm (noting that survey showed
that 97% of National Investor Relations Institute's members still conducted one-on-one
meetings).
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incentive to keep such disclosures secret), or (c) the SEC has been very
restrained in choosing its targets. Despite the contention that the limited
enforcement attempts illustrate Regulation FD's effectiveness, studies of
the Regulation's actual impact prove inconclusive, as described below.
C. Evaluations of Regulation FD
Commentators have argued, and even the SEC has conceded, that
Regulation FD might chill valuable issuer speech or reduce its
usefulness."' Leaving aside constitutional concerns for a moment, this
Article now turns to why selective disclosure might be desirable and
what empirical studies reveal.
Professor Steven Choi highlights several reasons why selective
disclosure may benefit investors. Most importantly, allowing issuers
to selectively disclose information may result in an increase in the
timeliness, quality, and quantity of information reaching the market,
which should make stock prices more accurate.'53 As Professors Ronald
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman explain, different means of disclosure can
result in differing pricing efficiency.154 In other words, some forms of
disclosure result in faster price adjustments. By prohibiting selective
disclosure and thereby reducing analyst effectiveness, u Regulation FD
may result in a less efficient market, which means more inaccurate
prices.'5  Accurate stock prices, however, are better for both the issuer
1 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000);
see Anil Arya et al., supra note 15, at 11 (finding unintended consequence of Regulation FD
may be net decline in information reaching market); Anwer S. Ahmed & Richard A.
Schneible, Jr., Did Regulation Fair Disclosure Level the Playing Field? Evidence from an
Analysis of Changes in Trading Volume and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings
Announcement, (Jan. 22, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=498002; As one of the
authors of the study, Professor Mittendorf, commented, "though Regulation FD was
created with an eye on curbing the behavior of financial market miscreants, our research
shows that the limitations inherent in the regulation may harm firms and analysts whose
intentions are pure." PRnewswire.com, Regulation Fair Disclosure May Increase Analyst
Herding, Inhibit Firm Disclosure According to Study by Yale School of Management, Ohio
State University, and Carnegie Melon University (May 3, 2005), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/05-
03-2005/0003539301&EDATE=.
152 Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 533, 541-48 (2002).
1 Id. at 541.
' See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 559 (1984).
" See Talosig, supra note 13, at 696-702.
5 Id. at 703-05.
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and the investor.15
7
In addition to increasing the accuracy of stock prices, selective
disclosure may be used to encourage analysts and significant
shareholders to engage in activities that benefit all shareholders, such as
monitoring management.'m However, selective disclosure also presents
potential harms to investors, such as uninformed traders bearing higher
costs. 15 9 As a result, Professor Choi concludes that "whether selective
disclosure results in net benefits or harms to investors is
indeterminate." 64
Finally, Professor Choi argues that, although Regulation FD covers a
broad range of disclosure, it is potentially an inadequate response. Its
inadequacy arises from the fact that it may not prevent management
from favoring selected market participants. 16 Likewise, Peter Talosig III
concludes that, although Regulation FD is a "noble" attempt, "[ilnvestors
have received little benefits from the regulation and many more
disadvantages.", 62  Empirical studies have yielded extensive, but
ultimately conflicting and inconclusive results. In studying Regulation
FD's effects, empirical researchers have examined data based on both
analyst information and public information metrics.
1. Analyst Information Metrics
Analyst information metrics include analyst earnings forecast163. 16
accuracy and forecast dispersion. The theory is that if, after
Regulation FD, analysts no longer receive privileged access to
information, then their forecasts may become less accurate and more
... See Choi, supra note 152, at 543-44 (explaining that issuers with more accurate stock
pricing may be able to pay their executives less, make acquisitions using lower value of
stock, and reduce risk facing their investors); see also Talosig, supra note 13, at 705-06.
" See, e.g., Choi, supra note 152, at 544-47; Stephen J. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Playing
Favorites with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 271, 294-95 (2002) (arguing that large investors
may be usefully subsidized by selective disclosure for monitoring management).
" See Choi, supra note 152, at 548-52 (listing potential harms).
10 Id. at 552.
161 Id. at 564-68; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
" Talosig, supra note 13, at 712, 714 (suggesting that Regulation FD may result in all
investors being less knowledgeable about issuers).
1 Forecast accuracy refers to the difference between the analyst's earnings forecast and
the company's actual earnings. JENNIFER FRANCIs ET AL., SEcURITY ANALYST INDEPENDENCE
69-70 (Research Foundation of CFA Institute (2004)).
1' Forecast dispersion refers to the amount of disagreement among analysts regarding
a company's earnings for a given quarter. Id. at 70. The higher the dispersion, the greater
the disagreement, and thus likely the higher the amount of uncertainty. Id.
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dispersed. If forecasts are less accurate, those investors who use such
forecasts will be hurt. Analysts may also have to work harder to obtain
their information, which will mean that they cover fewer companies.
In an early and often cited study that is perhaps most favorable to
Regulation FD, Professor Frank Heflin and colleagues looked specifically
at the financial information received by the markets before quarterly
earnings announcements.'6 Following Regulation FD, they found "no
reliable evidence of change in analysts' earnings forecast errors or
dispersion."166
Professor Philip Shane and his co-authors in another early study
examined analysts' forecasts. 67 Based on a comparison of forecasts in the
year preceding and following the introduction of Regulation FD, they
found that forecasts made early in the preceding quarter were less
accurate in the post-FD period, but that forecasts made late in the
preceding quarter were more accurate (at least after controlling for the
direction of the forecast error and the size of the earlier inaccuracy)16
They interpreted this result to mean that analysts had found a way of
overcoming information discrepancies, perhaps through more adept
information-processing or gathering.
169
Although Professors Partha Mohanram and Shyam Sunder confirmed
some of the above results,' 70 they also found that analyst forecasts
became less accurate and that the forecast dispersion increased.
171
Interestingly, more skilled analysts suffered a lower decline in
1 Frank Heflin et al., Regulation FD and the Financial Information Environment: Early
Evidence, 78 ACCT. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
166 Id.
167 Philip B. Shane et al., Earnings and Price Discovery in the Post-Reg. FD Information
Environment: A Preliminary Analysis, at 4-5 (Working Paper, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=291082.
168 Id.
11 Id. ("[Olur evidence suggests that in the post-Reg. FD period, analysts gather
relatively more uncertainty-relieving information between earnings announcements and,
by the end of the quarter, their forecasts are as accurate as they were in the prior year.").
"7 Partha S. Mohanram & Shyam V. Sunder, How Has Regulation Fair Disclosure Affected
the Functioning of Financial Analysts? 29-30 (Working Paper No. 29, Jan. 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=297933; see also Warren Bailey et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and
Earnings Information: Market, Analyst and Corporate Responses, 58 J. FIN. 2487, 2487 (2003)
(finding no change in forecast accuracy but increase in forecast dispersion); Afshad J. Irani
& Irene Karamanou, Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst Forecast
Dispersion, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 15, 15 (2003) (finding increase in forecast dispersion
subsequent to Regulation FD).
Mohanram & Sunder, supra note 170, at 29-30.
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172
accuracy. They concluded that analysts relied more on "idiosyncratic
information discovery" and analysis."73 This conclusion is consistent
with their finding that analysts covered fewer firms and firms with fewer
174
analysts following them and with anecdotal reports that the analyst's
job is tougher post Regulation FD.'75
In a recent study based on more extensive data, however, Professor
Anup Agrawal and colleagues also found a decrease in forecast176
accuracy. While earlier studies generally only looked at the short-term
impact of Regulation FD (i.e., a few quarters after its introduction), they
analyzed the medium-term impact (after fifteen quarters).' 77 In addition,
unlike Heflin et al. their study analyzed not just the last forecasts issued
,-178
before the earnings release, but also earlier forecasts. They found that
"earnings forecasts become less accurate following Reg FD, both at the
level of the individual analyst and the consensus."179 They also found
that there is greater dispersion of analyst forecasts following Regulation
FD.'18 Overall, they concluded that Regulation FD has been effective, in
the sense of reducing selective guidance, but that it has also resulted in
lower quality analyst forecasts. 8 1  Furthermore, the forecasts have
become worse over time.82
17 Id. But cf. Andreas Gintschel & Stanimir Markov, The Effectiveness
of Regulation FD, 37 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 293, 294, (2004), available at
http://gbspapers.library.emory.edu/archive/00000166/(finding that following Regulation
FD, difference in stock price impact of information distributed by high-status brokerage
houses and other brokerage houses declined by 50%).
" Mohanram & Sunder, supra note 170, at 29-30.
174 Irani & Karamanou, supra note 170, at 30.
" See, e.g., Daniel Rome Levine, Reg FD: Failed Directive Nearly 5 Years into New
Disclosure Rule, Some Say Communication Has Gotten Worse, CRAN'S CHI. Bus., May 16, 2005,
at 37.
"71 Anup Agrawal et al., Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Perfomance of
Sell-Side Analysts Following the SEC's Fair Disclosure Rules, J. Bus., *1 (forthcoming 2005-
2006), available at http://bama.ua.edu/-aagrawal/regfd.pdf.
" Id. at 3.
"7 Id. at 14-15 (noting that median age of their early and late consensus forecasts were
14 and 131 days, respectively).
7 Id. at 21,
'8 Id. at 20.
.8 Id. at 22.
182 Id. at 21. See also Talosig, supra note 13, at 689 (arguing that studies "prove that
analysts' earnings forecasts for individual companies are becoming less accurate").
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2. Public Information Metrics
Public information metrics include stock return volatility,1' stock
trading volumes, informational efficiency,M  and information
asymmetry.'9 If Regulation FD results in better information flow to the
public, stock prices should change more quickly and accurately,
resulting in reduced return volatility and increased trading volumes.
Alternatively, if Regulation FD worsens the information flow, then stock
prices may become more volatile. 8
117The empirical research, however, yields mixed results. Another
study by Professor Frank Heflin and colleagues found that Regulation
FD reduced return volatility around earnings announcements and• . 188
earnings pre-announcements, as did at least one other study.189 These
studies did not, however, allow for the concurrent effect of
decimalization, which led to a reduction in the minimum tick size.1 90
Studies that adjusted for decimalization found no significant difference
in return volatility before and after Regulation FD.19' Another study also
18 Return volatility is a measure intended to capture the market's perception of the
impact or information content of an event. FRANcIs, supra note 163, at 60.
1" Informational efficiency is a measure for how well stock prices reflect information
before it is publicly released. Id. at 63.
1 Information asymmetry is the "gap between knowledge possessed by informed
traders and uninformed traders." Id. at 67. One commonly used measure of information
asymmetry is the market maker's bid-ask spread, which is itself a function of order
processing and inventory costs and adverse selection costs. Id. Adverse selection cost is
the risk premium that market makers charge to mitigate their losses in transaction with
informed traders. Id.
18 Noise trading or trading on rumors may also increase between companies' more
infrequent public announcements.
187 But see Talosig, supra note 13, at 687 ("Recent studies overwhelmingly conclude
stock price volatility has increased after Reg. FD's effective date.").
8 Frank Heflin et al., Stock Return Volatility Before and After Regulation FD 4-5 (Soc. Sci.
Research Network, Working Paper No. 5, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=292879 (documenting higher return
volatility overall post Regulation FD, but concluding that Regulation FD was not cause).
9 See Shane et al., supra note 167, at 20 (finding decreased return volatility after
controlling for uncertainty levels at beginning of quarterly earnings information periods).
18' See BaIjit Sidhu et al., Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection
7 (Duke Univ., Working Paper, 2005), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/
-whaley/pubs/SSW1.pdf.
19' See, e.g., Bailey et al., supra note 170 (also finding increased trading volumes post
Regulation FD); Venkat R. Eleswarapu et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure:
Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry, 39 J. FIN. AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 10 Uune
2004), available at http://www.fundp.ac.be/chercher/index-eng.html (search under
author's name and select article's hyperlink). See also Chun I. Lee et al., Effect of Regulation
FD on Asymmetric Information, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 79, 79 (2004) (finding no significant
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found greater volatility in the stock prices of firms that previously held
closed conference calls.
19 2
In their analysis examining information asymmetry, Professor Venkat
Eleswarapu and colleagues looked at the bid-asked spread and order-
flow imbalance. 93 Their study found that after Regulation FD, there was
less information asymmetry, particularly for less liquid stocks, at least as
shown by trading costs. 94 This effect, however, only applied for stocks
that were decimalized. Professor Chiraphol Chiyachantana and
colleagues also reported that Regulation FD has effectively reduced the
level of information asymmetry in the days immediately before and after
earnings announcements. 95 Their study also showed that the reduction
is closely associated with reduced institutional trading.
196
In contrast, Vesna Straser, who studied measures of information
asymmetry using both the bid-ask spread and a measurement based on
transactional stock data, found an increase after Regulation FD.197 He
concluded that "at least initially, companies responded to the regulation
by providing more public information of lower quality." 198  Another
recent study found evidence suggesting that "the probability of informed
trading and the magnitude of the adverse selection cost component [that
indicates information asymmetry] incurred by investors have risen."' 99
Professor Baljit Sidhu and co-authors interpreted this result to mean that
Regulation FD had a chilling effect, in that inside information actually
increase in volatility post Regulation FD).
" Brian J. Bushee et al., Managerial and Investor Responses to Disclosure Regulation: The
Case of Reg FD and Conference Calls, 79 AcCT. REV. 617, 640 (2004). This result is consistent
with arguments that the volatility may be "a result of unsophisticated investors trading on
information without the benefit of professional analysis." Id. at 641.
19 Eleswarapu et al., supra note 191 (finding decline in adverse selection component of
trading costs). The bid-asked spread is the difference between the price a buyer is offering
for a security and the price a seller is willing to pay. Order flow imbalance refers to an
imbalance between buy and sell orders. Other proxies for information asymmetry include
"depths, volume, price volatility, [and] probability of private information trading." Vesna
Straser, Regulation Fair Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 3 n.6 (Soc. Sci. Research
Network, Working Paper No. 1, 2002), available at http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=311303.
.94 Eleswarapu, supra note 191, at 19-20; see also Lee et al., supra note 191, at 79-80
(finding little or no increase in information asymmetry as measured by adverse-selection
portion of bid-asked spread).
"9 Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on
Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis, 39 FIN. REv. 549,575 (2004).
"9 Id.
, Straser, supra note 193, at 1.
198 Id.
1" Sidhu et al., supra note 190, at 4.
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became more valuable because it was longer lasting and shared by fewer
recipients; thus market makers were forced to demand a larger risk
premium.mo
A significant criticism of the above studies is that their research design
- comparing metrics in pre- and post-Regulation FD time periods -
fails to allow for most or all other potential confounding causes for
change (or lack of change) in the metric.20 1 Professor Jennifer Francis and
colleagues note several other reasons besides Regulation FD that may
have altered firms' disclosure practices in the 2000-2002 period. These
reasons include the recession; the collapse of Internet stocks;
decimalization at the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX; the high-profile
Enron implosion; Worldcom's bankruptcy filing; and the Andersen
failure.0 2
Shedding further light on this issue, several teams of researchers have
compared domestic issuers with foreign issuers who have American
Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. 2 3
204Because foreign issuers are exempt from Regulation FD, they may
provide a good natural control sample.205 Francis and her co-authors
" Id. at 26. This finding depends on the insight that multiple recipients of identical
inside information will lead to an immediate price change in the security and an expected
profit of zero. See sources cited infra note 439.
" Jennifer Francis et al., Re-examining the Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure
Using Foreign Listed Firms to Controlfor Concurrent Shocks 2 (Duke Univ. Fuqua School
of Business, Working Paper No. 1-2, April 2005), available at
http:/ /faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-jfrancis/bio/Francis,%20Nanda%20and%2Wang/*20%5
BSept%202005%5D.pdf.
Id. at ln.1.
203 Prem G. Mathew, et al., A Reexamination of Information Flow in Financial Markets: The
Impact of Regulation FD and Decimalization, 43 Q.J. OF Bus. & ECON. 123, 124 (2004); Id.;
Armando R. Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the Cost of Capital
32-33 (Rodney L. White, Center for Fin. Research, Wharton, Working Paper No. 10567,
Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-rlwctr/papers/0413.pdf.
Another approach was to compare the relative effects of Regulation FD on different kinds
of companies: those that had previously held open conference calls and those that had
previously held closed calls. Brian J. Bushee et al., supra note 192, at 617. The study
concluded that, although the effect was not strong, the latter group of companies were less
likely to continue hosting conference calls after Regulation FD. Id.
2o4 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
Francis et. al, supra note 201, at 1-2. There are other competing explanations, such as
the fact that foreign firms may have followed Regulation FD's restrictions without being
required to do so. Id. at 3; see also Prem G. Mathew et al., How Has Regulation Fair
Disclosure Affected Liquidity?, at 4 (Working Paper), available at
http://207.36.165.114/Denver/Papers/liquidityRFD.pdf (noting that "some non-U.S.
issuer[s] feel that it is important to follow the guidelines" of Regulation FD, and listing
reasons) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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found no significant relative differences in various measures of public
and analyst information, both pre- and post-Regulation FD.206 These
results suggest that events other than the implementation of Regulation
FD affected the public information environment.207 They also found that
the informativeness of analysts' reports declined for U.S. firms both
when compared to pre-Regulation FD and relative to foreign firms with
ADRs. A more limited study by Professor Prem Mathew and co-
authors found an increase in return volatility for U.S. firms in the first
quarter after Regulation FD's effective date when compared to foreign
firms with ADRs, but the data was "consistent with this impact being
only temporary. "209
Overall, it is safe to say that Regulation FD has not had a calamitous
effect on the securities market, even if the desirability of the effect - or
whether there was any effect at all - remains disputed. Of course, just
because Regulation FD may not have been harmful, or was not as
harmful as expected, does not demonstrate that Regulation FD is
desirable or that other alternative approaches would not be better. It
also fails to prove that Regulation FD is consistent with the First
Amendment.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SEC REGULATIONS AFFECTING SPEECH
The First Amendment guarantees the right to engage in a variety of
expressive activities, including speech, free of government
intervention."' Until the last twenty-five years or so, plaintiffs rarely if
ever used the First Amendment to challenge federal securities
212regulations. Up until then, the courts perceived the government's
206 Francis et al., supra note 201, at 16.
207 Id.
'I Id. at 17.
209 Mathew et al., supra note 203, at 124. The authors also accept that limited
enforcement may explain their results. Id. at 133.
210 See infra Part IV.
211 U.S. CONST. amend. I states as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
21 See Arthur Pinto, The Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the
Government, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (1989) (noting that dearth of First Amendment
challenges may be due, in part, to fact that speech regulated by federal securities laws did
not obviously touch upon traditional First Amendment concerns, such as political,
religious, or artistic speech); see also, Allen Boyer, Free Speech, Free Markets, and Foolish
Consistency, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 474,495 (1992) (reviewing NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE
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ability to mandate the full and fair disclosure of information by a
company subject to federal securities laws as essential to preserving the
integrity of the capital markets.1
13
While still limited in number, an increasing number of plaintiffs have
raised the First Amendment to attack a number of federal securities
214 215regulations, including Regulation FD. The expansion of First
Amendment jurisprudence into the realm of securities regulation stems
from a variety of factors, including a willingness by scholars and the
courts to recognize that economic rights can be closely aligned with the
traditional rights protected by the First Amendment.2 16
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC (1990)) (arguing that "the [Supreme] Court has ...
rejected any implication that the First Amendment should be applied in the securities
field"). Likewise, it was not clear that commercial speech was protected by the First
Amendment until 1976. See infra Part M.A.
213 Congress enacted federal securities laws during the New Deal to address the
perceived fraud and other abuses endemic to both the sale and trading of securities. See
Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1,
51 (1983); see also SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted) (stating that "[i]f speech employed directly or indirectly to sell securities were
totally protected, any regulation of the securities market would be infeasible - and that
result has long since been rejected").
214 See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 664 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendant's claim
that district court violated his First Amendment rights because court was unduly
influenced by defendant's claims of innocence and by defendant's allegations that
government's imposition of maximum civil penalty for insider trading violations resulted
from government conspiracy); United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D.
Utah 2003) (rejecting First Amendment challenge); SEC v. Corp. Relations Group, NOV
6:99-CV-1222-Orl-28KRS, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24925, at *43-46 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2003)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge to application of Section 17(b) to publisher who
discloses that its publication is paid advertisement); SEC v. Huttoe, 96-2453(GK), 1998 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 23211, at *38-44 (D.D.C. Sept, 14, 1998) (rejecting First Amendment challenge);
Wall St. Publ'g. Inst., 851 F.2d at 373 (accepting that First Amendment does limit regulation
in securities field); cf. Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 1998) (reviewing provision of Commodity Exchange
Act requiring registration of commodities investment advisors and concluding that
independent investment advice is not commercial speech, but rather fully protected
speech); SEC v. Blount, 61 F.3d 938, 941-43 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying strict scrutiny under
First Amendment to SEC rule restricting sellers of municipal securities from making
political contributions); SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304, 1309-10 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(showing that although not raised by parties, court considered sua sponte First
Amendment implications of enjoining unregistered investment adviser from publishing
investment advice regarding companies in which adviser had personal and financial
interest).
215 See SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.). Discussed
supra at notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
216 See NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 113-19
(Quorum Books (1990)); Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24
GA. L. REv. 223, 225-26 (1990) (arguing that to view commercial speech "as some second-
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Although a number of courts and commentators have recognized thatS 217
some constitutional scrutiny should apply to federal securities laws,
class species of expression is to ignore the contribution such speech makes to the societal
commitment to decentralized decision making ... such speech ... [is] an integral part of
the 'system of freedom of expression"'); Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the
SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 276-77 (1988) (arguing that "SEC speech" is form of commercial
speech which nonetheless deserves full constitutional protection because commercial
speech and political speech are indistinguishable); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (noting that "[e]ven an individual
advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest," thus
touching upon speech traditionally protected by First Amendment (citing Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975), for proposition that "[plurely factual matter of public
interest may claim protection")). Arthur Pinto has catalogued other factors that have led to
an increase in First Amendment challenges. See Pinto, supra note 212, at 78 n.5 (citations
omitted) (noting law and economics movement raises questions about all forms of
government regulation that interferes with efficient operations of markets; belief by some
commentators that private arrangements as opposed to government intervention is proper
mode of dealing with issues of corporate law; growing acceptance of efficient capital
market hypothesis, which questions system of disclosure that underlies 1934 Securities
Exchange Act because Act creates system that is concerned with timing and use of past
information presented in particular form to investors; institutionalization of markets,
which means that large economic players are involved in market and can protect against
insufficient and improper information reaching those markets; and political aspects of
securities law have become more apparent, and thus, speech may involve political speech
protected traditionally by First Amendment).
217 See SEC v. Wall Street Publ'g. Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (accepting
that First Amendment applies to securities regulation); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163, 194-
202 (1994) (concluding that some securities regulations may violate First Amendment);
Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment: Toward a Marketplace of Ideas
in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 843 (1985) (arguing that ever since
commercial speech was granted constitutional protection, securities regulations "must
comport" with First Amendment); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government
Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 37 (1989); Pinto, supra note 212, at 87-88
(agreeing with application of First Amendment to securities regulation, but generally
arguing that complexities of capital markets justifies significant government regulation,
particularly as it relates to mandatory disclosure requirements); Lloyd L. Drury IlI,
Disclosure is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment Constraints on SEC
Regulatory Authority (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=791706
(arguing that First Amendment should be applied to SEC regulations, but that bulk of
regulations will survive strict scrutiny). But cf. Michael P. Dooley, The First Amendment and
the SEC: A Comment, 20 CONN. L. REV. 335, 352 (1988) (arguing that First Amendment
commercial speech doctrine should not be extended to other areas of federal securities
regulation, besides solicitation rules, unless courts are willing to resurrect Lochner-like
"substantive due process" review of economic legislation); Schauer, supra note 26, at 1765
("[Slecurities Regulation . . . involve[s] legal control of speech lying well beyond the
boundaries of the First Amendment's concern."). Schauer's claim is later moderated to one
that says securities regulation is "a domain largely outside the coverage of the First
Amendment." Id. at 1780. This is correct, because as Schauer notes, the SEC is normally
concerned with whether information is false and misleading. Id. at 1778-79. False and
misleading speech is a category of speech that has never been protected by the First
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there is no consensus and no definitive statement from the Supreme
Court'18 as to whether traditional First Amendment protections should
apply or a more limited commercial speech analysis2 19 should govern. 2
First, this section examines the cases applying the First Amendment to
federal securities regulations in general.22 1 While there is a notable lack
of consistency among the courts in resolving First Amendment attacks
on federal securities regulations, there are some relevant threshold
considerations in analyzing Regulation FD. Among these considerations
Amendment. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976) (stating that "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been
protected for its own sake" (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49, 51 n.10 (1961))). False and misleading information,
however, is not Regulation FD's concern.
"' See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 234 (1985) (declining to directly address whether
speech regulated by SEC is "commercial"); cf. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 796 n.9 (1988) (hinting that regulation of securities field involved purely commercial
speech).
219 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(stating that "Constitution affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression"); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978). ("To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force
of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than
subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."). But see Nicole B. Casarez,
Don't Tell Me What To Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 MO. L.
REV. 929, 930 n.10 (1998) (citing William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640 (1996) (stating that "like
treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech is an idea who[se] time has evidently
arrived")); Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 555 (1997) (opining
that Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), "appeared to reject the
'step child' status of commercial speech in everything but name").
220 See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (D. Utah 2003)
(applying commercial speech analysis to Section 17(b) of Securities Act that required
defendant to announce receipt of consideration for promoting stock); see also WOLFSON,
supra note 216, passim (1988) (arguing that speech regulated by SEC, although characterized
as commercial speech, is more akin to political-artistic speech which deserves full
constitutional protection); Neuborne, supra note 217, at 37 (arguing for application of
expanded commercial speech doctrine in federal securities law area which would greatly
increase burden on government to justify regulating speech in this context); cf. Lowe v.
SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (noting that, although majority opinion
avoided deciding case based on constitutional question, regulation of investment advisers
under Investment Advisers Act of 1940 operated as "a direct restraint on freedom of speech
and of press subject to searching scrutiny called for by First Amendment").
21 We also examine analogies drawn from case law in the commodities context.
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are whether Regulation FD targets speech per se and whether Regulation
FD depends on the content of the speech. This section concludes by
finding that Regulation FD targets speech per se as well as its content.
A. Raising the First Amendment Against Securities Laws
1. Lowe Suggests High Levels of Protection for SEC-Regulated
Speech
The first time the Supreme Court considered applying the First
Amendment to federal securities regulations was in Lowe v. SEC.m In
Lowe, the Supreme Court held that publishers who were not registered as
investment advisers could not be permanently enjoined from publishing
nonpersonalized investment advice and commentary in securities
newsletters because the newsletters fell within an exception to the
Investment Advisers Exclusion Act.m Although the majority opinion
decided the case on statutory grounds, the Court noted that because the
expression of a factual opinion about a commercial product is protected
by the First Amendment, "it is difficult to see why the expression of an
opinion about a marketable security should not also be protected.",
24
Justice White's concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, is of greater interest, for it directly confronts the
constitutional claim. The concurrence would have found that the
Investment Advisers Exclusion Act violated the First Amendment
because the Act banned legitimate, disinterested investment advice, as
well as fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative advice; thus, the Act
operated as a presumptively invalid prior restraint on fully-protected
speech2m Although the defendant in Lowe argued that the expression
472 U.S. 181 (1985).
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (2005) (providing exception from Investment Advisors
Exclusion Act for publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine, or business or
financial publication of general and regular circulation). The Court had previously noted
that the penalizing of a negligent misstatement on a registration statement was an example,
along with mail fraud and common law fraud, "that the right to communicate information
of public interest is not 'unconditional.'" Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 n.14
(1967) (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 77k).
14 472 U.S. at 210 n.58.
' Id. at 234. In both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson, the Supreme
Court noted that the "greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech make it less
necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker" and "may also
make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
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contained in the newsletters should enjoy full constitutional protection
because it did not propose a commercial transaction between the speaker
and his audience and, therefore, was not commercial speech, the
concurring opinion declined to address this point.22 6
Relying in part on Lowe, the Seventh Circuit in Commodity Trend
Services, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, concluded that
independent investment advice regarding commodities trading was fully
protected speech.22 7  The type of investment advice contained in the
defendant's newsletter included, among other things, historical price
ranges for various markets, "hot picks" (impersonal trading
recommendations and market commentaries), general instructions on
how to trade in the commodities markets, methods of reducing trading
risk, and extrapolating useful information from long-term market trends.
Applying the narrower definition of commercial speech to the speech
contained in the defendant's newsletter, namely "speech which does no
more than propose a commercial transaction,"m the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the regulated speech did not propose a commercial
transaction between the defendant and a specific customer.2 2 9 Instead,
the speech was analogous to a restaurant review or a Consumer Reports
article, which are fully protected by the First Amendment.23
2. Wall Street: Intermediate Protection at Most
Three years after the Lowe decision, in SEC v. Wall Street, the D.C.
Circuit examined the SEC's attempt to enjoin a publisher of a financial
investment magazine from publishing articles featuring particular
companies' securities without disclosing that it received consideration
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). The concurring opinion's
use in Lowe of the prior restraint analytical framework suggests that those three Justices
considered the speech at issue, financial investment advice, deserving of more protection
than - or at least different from - commercial speech. 472 U.S. at 210.
472 U.S. at 210.
Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679,
684-86 (7th Cir. 1998) (reviewing challenge to provision of Commodity Exchange Act,
analogous to section 17(b) of Investment Advisers Act, that required commodity
investment advisers to register with Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
' Id. at 684 (quotations omitted). See infra Part III.A for a discussion of different
Supreme Court definitions of commercial speech.
Commodity Futures, 149 F.3d at 686.
Id. Wolfson takes this same point even further, arguing that there is no real
distinction between an advertisement for shampoo and a book that extols the advantages of
a brand of shampoo. See WOLFSON, supra note 216, at 2.
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from those companies under Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933. 231
The consideration included free text, drafted and provided by the
company, which the publisher incorporated into the magazine articles. 2
The D.C. Circuit suggested that the articles about companies and their
stocks were not commercial speech because they did not contain speech
that was concededly an advertisement, referred to a specific product,
and was motivated by economic interests.2
Despite these findings, the D.C. Circuit did not grant full First
Amendment protection to the speech as Justice White did in Lowe.2m
Rather, the D.C. Circuit characterized the speech as a "distinct category
of communications in which the government's power to regulate is at
least as broad as with respect to the general rubric of commercial
speech."23 The D.C. Circuit justified this characterization based on "the
federal government's broad powers to regulate the securities
industry."m However, it also conceded that after the Supreme Court's
decision in Lowe, "it would be an overstatement to assert that the First
,,237 DCAmendment does not limit regulation in the securities area. The D.C.
Circuit simultaneously acknowledged that the disclosure requirement
could not depend on the content of the publication.m If a determination
of the payment of consideration required the court to consider the degree
to which the featured company contributed to the article's content, the
"SEC and the federal judiciary would be propelled into what is very
close to content regulation of speech,"23 9 which is "particularly repugnant
to core First Amendment concerns." 24'
2"1 SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Section 17(b)
prohibits publishing a description of a security in exchange for undisclosed consideration.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2005).
23 851 F.2d at 374.
' Id. at 372 (applying formulation of commercial speech contained in Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67, 103 (1983)); cf. United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp.
2d 1296, 1298 (D. Utah 2003) (finding that section 17(b) of Investment Advisors Act
regulates only commercial speech and, therefore, is not subject to strict scrutiny).
The D.C. Circuit distinguished Lowe on several grounds, including the absence in
Lowe of any allegation that the investment publication in that case disseminated fraudulent
or misleading information. Wall Street Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d at 371.
Id. at 373.
' Id. at 372.
'7 Id. at 373.
Id. at 375.
' Id. (citation omitted).
2 Id. at 374 (citation omitted).
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3. Other Courts Give SEC-Regulated Speech Minimal Protection
Subsequently, courts reviewing First Amendment challenges to
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act, the same section reviewed in Wall
Street, concluded that the Regulation did no more than compel
commercial speech to prevent fraudulent or misleading statements and
thus deserved only minimal constitutional protection. For example,
the district court in United States v. Wenger applied the rational basis test
to find that Section 17(b) was "reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception of consumers." 242 Similarly, in SEC v. Huttoe, the
district court applied the rational basis test to hold that Section 17(b) did
not violate the First Amendment because the SEC did not seek to
regulate the content of the defendant's investment articles, but rather
required defendant to disclose that he received consideration for touting
particular stocks to protect the investing public.24
Different applications of the level of First Amendment protection
demonstrate that there is no monolithic approach to the broad field of
securities regulation. At a minimum, however, a court should address
the following threshold issues: does the regulation target speech per se
and does the regulation target the content of the speech?
B. Threshold Questions: Speech and Content
1. Does Regulation FD Target Speech Per Se?
At first glance, it appears fairly obvious that Regulation FD targets
speech, in that disclosure necessitates speech.244 However, in heavily
24546
regulated industries such as the legal profession,243 fruit growing, 24 and
24 United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1298 (D. Utah 2003); SEC v. Huttoe
No. 96-2453(GK), 1998 WL 34078092, at "10 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (applying rational basis
test). See infra Part 1II.D for a discussion of compelled commercial speech.
24 Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
24 Huttoe, 1998 WL 34078092 at "10.
24 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2005). Even the nonverbal conduct at issue in Schering-
Plough qualifies as expressive conduct. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
2" See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to state bar disciplinary rule).
2 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-70 (1997) (justifying
forced contributions by California fruit growers to generic advertising because of extensive
federal regulation of fruit growers generally established by Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937); infra notes 363-66 and accompanying text.
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gambling,4 7 courts hesitate to strike down regulations affecting speech
because of the government's vast authority to regulate these businesses.
Even in the context of a highly regulated industry, however, there exists
a key distinction between regulations targeting the speech itself2"4 and
regulations targeting an industry's conduct that may evince itself
through speech.249  The Supreme Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association explained the latter type of regulation as follows:
It has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Numerous examples
could be cited of communications that are regulated without
offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of
information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the
exchange of price and production information among competitors,
and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees. Each of these examples illustrates that the State does
not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful
to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity.2
The government, however, cannot go too far and attempt to regulate
the speech itself without implicating the First Amendment. 2 1 As Justice
White explained in his concurrence in Lowe "the principle that the
government may restrict entry into professions and vocations through
licensing schemes has never been extended to encompass the licensing of
speech per se .... " Justice White further noted that "[alt some point, a
measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a regulation of
speech or of the press; beyond that point, the statute must survive the
... See Posadas de P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (holding that
prohibiting advertising by casino, which has traditionally been subject to heavy
governmental regulation, did not violate First Amendment); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509-10 (1996) (plurality opinion) (declining to give force to
Posadas's "highly deferential approach," stating that "we are now persuaded that Posadas
erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis").
24 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC. 472 U.S. 181, 229-30 (1985) (discussed supra in Part II.A.1).
... See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468; cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973)
(stating that "[wihere communication of ideas, protected by the First Amendment, is not
involved, or the particular privacy of the home protected by Stanley, or any of the other
,areas or zones' of constitutionally protected privacy, the mere fact that, as a consequence,
some human 'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be incidentally affected does not bar the State
from acting to protect legitimate state interests").
250 436 U.S. at 457 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 229-30 (White, J., concurring).
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level of scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment." 25'
Recently in Department of Agriculture v. United Foods, the Supreme
Court drew attention to this distinction between regulations that target
speech per se and regulations of an industry's conduct that may evince
itself through speech. 53  The Court affirmed that it has "not upheld
compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the
principal object is speech itself."2
Like the agricultural industry in United Foods, commentators often cite
the securities industry as an example of a heavily regulated industry that
justifies substantial government regulation.55  Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Ohralik referred explicitly to the "exchange of information about
securities" as an example of permissible government regulation56 The
question then becomes, does Regulation FD target speech per se, or does
it attempt to regulate conduct that merely evinces itself through speech?
In an unprecedented departure from prior SEC regulations requiring
affirmative disclosure to avoid fraud or prevent insider trading,
Regulation FD requires no conduct whatsoever, besides the speech itself,
to trigger liability.259  Liability attaches instantly when a corporate
speaker intentionally disseminates material nonpublic information to
some individuals but not others. 260 The Supreme Court's language in
22 Id. (citations omitted).
U.S. Dep't of Agric.v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001).
z' Id.; see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:43
(Oct. 2004) (citations omitted) ("For it is only the linkage between commercial speech and a
commercial transaction that gives the government the theoretical leverage to presume to
regulate the speech at all .... In classic First Amendment terms, however, the one thing
that government may not do is regulate speech because it 'sells' a lifestyles, fantasy, ethos,
identity, or attitude that happens to be regarded by most as socially corrosive.").
' See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)
(plurality opinion) (exchange of information relating to securities is area of permissible
regulation); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456; Bangor & Aroostock R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 574 F.2d 1096, 1107 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that "the First Amendment has not yet
been held to limit regulation in areas of extensive economic supervision, such as the
securities, antitrust, and transportation fields, where the exchange of information can be a
vital element in an illegal scheme"); Boyer, supra note 212, at 495 (arguing that "the
[Supreme] Court has . .. rejected any implication that the First Amendment should be
applied in the securities field"); Pinto, supra note 212, at 77-78 (arguing for extensive
government regulation of securities industry and minimal role for First Amendment).
21 436 U.S. at 456.
' See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 17(b) (2005) (requiring
defendant to announce receipt of consideration for promoting stock).
' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2005) (requiring only disclosure).
21 See supra Part I.A.
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Ohralik indicates that the Court may approve a regulation of speech that
is only incidental to the prohibited commercial activity, such as insider
trading. The Court in Ohralik, however, did not contemplate the SEC's
regulation of speech per se that is not incidental to any commercial
activity, as is the case with Regulation FD. 26 Even in SEC v. Wall Street,
the D.C. Circuit suggested that the SEC's broad regulatory powers
cannot extend to content-based regulations of speech per se with no
262
additional conduct required to impose liability. Given that Regulation
FD targets pure speech, the next question is whether it targets the
content as well.
2. Does Regulation FD Target the Speech's Content?
As discussed in the prior section, the securities laws not only regulate
the affirmative disclosure of information that the SEC believes investors
need to avoid fraud,63 but may also restrict the time, place, and manner
of speech. 2 4 The SEC argues that Regulation FD is only a time, place,
and manner regulation of speech because it mandates disclosure to the
public of information previously or simultaneously disclosed only to
select individuals.2  In other words, Regulation FD does not mandate
the disclosure of new information, but rather regulates the manner and
" The SEC mandates the disclosure of some categories of corporate information on a
periodic basis. See, e.g., Reg. S-K, SEC Rule 12b-20, Items 1-2 of Form 10, Form 8-K,
§ 12(b)(1). The information required includes such topics as the "organization, structure
and nature of the business." 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(1)(A) (2005). The justification for such
mandatory disclosure requirements is to regulate speech to effectuate the broad goals of
the federal securities laws, including the full disclosure of some information. These
disclosure requirements, however, are not triggered by a corporation's speech to a private
audience, as is the case with Regulation FD.
262 SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see supra notes 234-37
and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 17(b) (2005).
See Pinto, supra note 212, at 89.
26 SEC Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 17-22, SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d
694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 CV 5130), available at 2004 WL 3142263 [hereinafter SEC
Opposition]. The SEC has also argued that because it has no animus for the ideas
expressed in the material, nonpublic information, Regulation FD does not regulate content.
Id. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected the argument that "discriminatory
... treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to
suppress certain ideas." See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
429 (1993) (citation omitted); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
("[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech."').
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timing of the disclosure of previously-disclosed information.2 Thus, the
SEC argues, Regulation FD is not a content-based regulation that would
trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny.27
Unlike true time, place, and manner regulations that are content-
neutral, 26 Regulation FD is content-based on three grounds.269  First,
Regulation FD explicitly targets only "material, nonpublic information,"
which is a specific category of information distinguished by its
"material" and "nonpublic" nature.'7 Indeed, the SEC is only concerned
that corporate speakers generally disclose "material, nonpublic"
information, as opposed to all information, because the investing public
is presumably only interested in a company's "material" information (i.e.
information that could affect stock prices, and therefore, the public's
investment decisions).7 For example, if a company announces publicly
that its earnings are expected to be $1 billion next quarter but announces
in private that it will be $1.01 billion, the difference is unlikely to be
material. Regulation FD would not apply to the disclosure. If instead,
however, the company states in private that its earnings will be $1.1
billion, this would probably be material, and Regulation FD should
apply. The content, $1.1 billion as opposed to $1.01 billion, is not mere
rounding error; it determines the applicability of the regulation.
SEC Opposition, supra note 265, at 17-18.
"7 Id.; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (noting that time, place, and manner restriction on prescription drug
advertising would be acceptable if justified without reference to content of regulated
speech).
See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000)
(upholding Colorado statute restricting picketers and others engaging in oral protest,
education, or counseling from approaching individuals outside abortion clinics as valid
time, place, and manner restriction, and conceding that some limited review of picket
signs' content may be necessary, but only to determine whether "rule of law applies to a
course of conduct").
The claim that Regulation FD is content-based was also made by Siebel. See, e.g.,
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 17-18, SEC v. Siebel Sys., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 CV
5130), available at 2004 WL 3142264 ("There can be no dispute that Regulation FD regulates
speech on the basis of content . . . depending on whether a covered speaker has uttered
material nonpublic information."); see also Ribstein, supra note 16 (stating that Regulation
FD "clearly regulates the content of speech since it reaches only statements that are
'material' to reasonable investors").
"' See supra Part I.A.3; see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
537 (1980) ("The First Amendment's hostility to content based regulation extends not only
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an
entire topic.").
27 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Supreme Court's rationale in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo27 is relevant to showing that Regulation FD is content-based.
There, the Supreme Court reasoned that making a corporation speak
under circumstances in which it otherwise would not speak necessarily
changes the content of the speech. In Miami Herald, Florida's right of
reply statute, which compelled the defendant newspaper to publish the
counterarguments of those individuals it previously criticized, interfered
with the newspaper's exercise of editorial control and judgment by
forcing the newspaper to tailor its speech to an opponent's agenda and
• 273
to respond to a candidate's argument when it wished to remain silent.
The Court thus concluded that this was a content-based restriction on
free speech.274
Like the right of reply statute in Miami Herald, Regulation FD imposes
a content-based restriction on corporate speech. Under Regulation FD,
even if a corporate speaker ends up making the same speech twice, the
Regulation forces the corporate speaker to make the speech a second
275time publicly and to an audience not of its own choosing. If a
company knows that it will have to make the same speech to a different
audience, the company may well alter the content of the speech in the
first instance or forego speaking completely. 276
Third, Regulation FD targets the "communicative impact" of the
speech on the listener. In Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court drew a
distinction between regulations that are "justified without reference to
2- 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 256.
27 The freedom to associate with whomever one chooses to advance one's beliefs is a
well-established right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (stating that "[o]ur decisions establish with
unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments ....");
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (stating that "[iut is beyond debate that
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech .... Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny.").
26 See, e.g., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258; see infra note 379-82 and accompanying text;
see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (finding that
statute compelling disdosure by professional fundraisers to potential donors was content-
based because "mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily
alters the content of the speech").
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the content of the regulated speech"27 and "regulations that focus on the
direct impact of speech on its audience."27 8 The first type of regulation is
content-neutral, whereas the second type of regulation is content-
279based. In other words, if a regulation is justified based on the listener's
reaction to the communication, then such a regulation is content-based.m
The SEC's purposes in enacting Regulation FD, which are discussed in
more detail in Part IV, hinge on the importance of "material, nonpublic
information" to the audience - both to securities market professionals
and to the public. Thus, Regulation FD is only justified with reference to
the content of the regulated speech. Furthermore, Regulation FD targets
the impact that the disclosure of "material, nonpublic information" may
have on the behavior of the people who hear the information (i.e.,
trading, or in the case of analysts, changing a recommendation) and on
the public in general (i.e., increased investor confidence in the
marketplace).
As described above, Regulation FD is best analyzed as a content-based
regulation on pure speech. If the speech involves topics traditionally
protected by the First Amendment, regulations on such speech are
subject to strict scrutiny.2 1  Because Regulation FD mandates the
disclosure of "material, nonpublic information" by corporate speakers in
the world of securities, the level of scrutiny depends on how the court
characterizes the speech.
Regulation FD may target both disclosures resembling commercial
speech ("you should buy our stock because we will meet our earnings
forecast") and non-commercial protected speech ("we have decided to
terminate our joint venture in Burma because we are concerned about
human rights abuses"). 2 In addition, Regulation FD may compel
speech, in that it forces a corporation to make information public. It may
also restrict private speech, in that a corporation simply will not disclose
proprietary business or other types of confidential information if it
knows it must then make the information public.2 The next part
examines the four most likely ways that the courts may characterize
2- 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (citations omitted).
'" Id. at 320.
- Id. at 320-21.
"o Id.; see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990).
28 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
22 Such speech may well be material. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 920 (2001)
(affirming dismissal of long running case claiming international human rights violations by
Unocal in Burma); infra notes 3335-44 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 379-87 and accompanying text.
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Regulation FD speech.2
III. WHAT AND How DOES REGULATION FD REGULATE?
The Supreme Court applies a different standard of review based on
whether the government regulates commercial speech or non-
commercial speech.2 5 The appropriate standard of review also depends
on whether the regulation compels or prohibits speech.2' 6  This part
examines these different categories of speech and regulation.
A. Restricting Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence is far from
217
consistent. The difficulties of identifying commercial speech coupled
2" The following table showing the four possible outcomes based on the interaction of
the nature of the regulation and the nature of the speech may be helpful:
restricting mixed compelling mixed commercial/political
commercial/political speech speech
restricting pure commercial speech compelling pure commercial speech
As discussed supra at note 26, some commentators would presumably argue that actually
Regulation FD should be analyzed in a completely separate box:
I Beyond the scope of the First Amendment
Securities regulation
Economic regulations
See Schauer, supra note 26, at 1771. Before Virginia Pharmacy, the argument would have
been that commercial speech should also be in this box. See infra Part III.A.
' See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787-88 (1978) (applying strict
scrutiny to regulation of corporate speech on matters of public interest); cf. Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-71 (1980) (applying
intermediate-type scrutiny to commercial speech).
' See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985)
(applying rational basis-type test to compelled commercial speech); cf. Cent. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 564-71 (applying intermediate-type scrutiny to prohibitions on commercial speech).
28 Commentators have already written extensively on the inconsistencies and vagaries
of the commercial speech doctrine, and their analysis will not be repeated here. However,
the overarching consensus appears to be that the definition of commercial speech "cannot
be reduced to any simple rule or determinate criteria." Robert Post, The Constitutional
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 17 (2000); see, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 216,
at 224 (arguing that "the Court's [commercial speech] doctrine lacks conceptual
coherence"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into The Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and
Children's Television Programming, 45 DUKE L.J. 1193,1212-13 (1996) (observing that Supreme
Court "never has defined precisely what constitutes commercial speech, nor has it
2005]
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with its increasing protectionm prompts commentators to recommend
that the Court should eliminate the distinction altogether. 289  Given,
however, that the classification currently remains the law of the land, a
brief overview of the leading cases is necessary.
Before 1976, the Supreme Court refused to apply First Amendment
protection to purely commercial speech.i In a 1942 case, Valentine v.
Chrestensen, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e are ... clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising." 291 The Court cited to no authority, and as a
provided a set of analytical tools one can use to accurately and efficiently separate
commercial speech from non-commercial speech"); Martin H. Redish & Howard M.
Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free
Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 237-38 (1998) (arguing against separate classification
and lower level of review for commercial speech). At least one Supreme Court Justice has
suggested that he "doubt[s] whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,
493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "borders of the commercial speech category
are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed"); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765
(1993) ("ambiguities may exist at the margins of the category of commercial speech"); City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (recognizing "the
difficult of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct
category"). Other Supreme Court decisions applying the commercial speech doctrine
include: In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199-207 (1982) (finding rules preventing attorneys from
using non-deceptive terminology to describe their fields of practice impermissible);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 498-521 (1981) (discussing outdoor
advertising); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 436-38 (1978) (finding letter by civil rights lawyer to
prospective members of litigant class protected by First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366-79 (1977) (addressing blanket bans on price advertising by attorneys
unconstitutional); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977)
(scrutinizing contraceptive ads); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
91-98 (1977) (striking ban on "for sale" signs outside of houses).
" See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Afterword: Free the Fortune 500! The Debate Over Corporate
Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1277, 1293 (2004) ("The cases
sustaining restrictions on commercial speech pale, however, in number and in force, when
compared to the overwhelming body of precedent striking restrictions down."); Nat Stem,
In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REv. 55, 88 (1999) ("[T]he
notion that classifying speech as commercial regulates it to a First Amendment backwater
has become increasingly antiquated."); see also infra notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
" See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV
627, 638 (1990) (arguing that commercial and non-commercial speech should receive equal
protection); Sean P. Costelllo, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
681, 686 (1997) (noting that majority of Supreme Court Justices appear ready to apply strict
scrutiny review to some forms of commercial speech).
' Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 754-61
(1976) (discussing history of Court's commercial speech jurisprudence).
21 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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later Justice suggested, "[t]he ruling was casual, almost offhand." 292
The Supreme Court first expressly extended First Amendment
protection to commercial speech 93 in the 1976 case of Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. There, the Supreme
Court used the First Amendment to strike down a Virginia statute
prohibiting pharmacists from publishing advertising that contained
pricing and other information about the prescription drugs they sold.' 94
The Court described the protected speech at issue as bereft of any
"editorializ[ing]" on "cultural, philosophical or political" matters or of
any "generalized observations even about commercial matters." 295 The
only "idea" the pharmacist wished to communicate was "I will sell you
the X prescription drug at the Y price."296 The Court held that in the case
of advertising of prescription drugs by pharmacists, such concededly
truthful speech that did no more than describe a lawful commercial
transaction was commercial speech that deserved First Amendment
297protection. The Court further noted how easily purely "commercial
speech" could become protected speech involving "general public
interest.
2 9
Four years later in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, the Supreme Court struck down a ban on promotional
2 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
" The Court had previously decided that not all advertisements were commercial
speech. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (applying First
Amendment to advertisement that "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a
movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern").
294 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773
(1976). The Virginia Pharmacy decision addressed the First Amendment question left open
by Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, in which the Court
denied First Amendment protection on the grounds that the advertised activity was illegal
employment discrimination. 413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973). However, the Court declined to
resolve whether the First Amendment would outweigh the government's interest in
regulating advertising where the activity involved is not illegal. Id.
29. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
296 Id.
'9 Id. at 770.
28 Id. at 764 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (involving advertisements
stating that referral services for legal abortions are available)); Chi. Joint Bd. v. Chi. Trib.
Co., 435 F.2d 470, 478 (7th Cir. 1970) (involving domestic producer who advertises his
product as alternative to imports that tend to deprive American residents of their jobs); Fur
Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(involving manufacturer of artificial furs who promotes his product as alternative to
extinction by his competitors of fur-bearing mammals).
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advertising by an electrical utility.299  In so doing, it crafted a new
definition of commercial speech and a new intermediate standard of
review. 0' The Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment's concern for
commercial speech is based on the informational function of
advertising." 3°1 It also defined commercial speech as "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," 302 an
expanded definition compared to that in Virginia Pharmacy.m
The Supreme Court once again affirmed that "speech which does no
more than propose a commercial transaction" constitutes the core of the
commercial speech doctrine in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.3
Significantly, the Court did not use the broader definition of commercial
speech first articulated in Central Hudson.3°s The Court instead identified
three neither necessary nor sufficient characteristics of commercial
speech: speech that 1) is concededly an advertisement, 2) refers to a
specific product, and 3) is motivated by economic interest.3
In a more recent commercial speech case, Board of Trustees of State
University of New York v. Fox,307 the Supreme Court once again declined
to use the broader definition of commercial speech articulated in Central
- 447 U.S. 557, 572 (1980).
' Central Hudson's four-part intermediate test for analyzing commercial speech
requires that: (1) the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity;
(2) the government must assert a substantial interest; (3) the restriction must directly
advance the governmental interest involved; and (4) the restriction must not be more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 564-71.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 561.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that majority
opinion's definition of commercial speech as "expression related solely to economic
interests of the speaker and its audience" is too broad and definition of commercial speech
as "speech proposing a commercial transaction" in Virginia Pharmacy is too narrow, citing
Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 382-
83 (1979)).
463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (holding that federal statute prohibiting mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives could not be applied to appellee's
promotional materials).
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993) (noting
pointedly that Court did not use "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience" definition of commercial speech in either Bolger or Board of
Trustees of State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 422. The D.C. Circuit in SEC v. Wall Street,
discussed supra note 231-40 and accompanying text, relied on the definition of commercial
speech in Youngs Drug to conclude that the speech regulated by section 17(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 did not fall neatly into the category of commercial speech.
851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
' 492 U.S. at 480.
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Hudson. Rather, the Court described the category of commercial speech
even more narrowly. The Court characterized the "proposal of a
commercial transaction" as "the test for identifying commercial
speech."m'
The trend towards protecting commercial speech continued during the
last decade. A plurality of the Supreme Court appeared to grant even
more First Amendment protection to commercial speech in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.i The Court examined a Rhode Island
statute prohibiting the publication or broadcast of the price of any
alcoholic beverages in any advertising within the state.3 " Beginning with
311
a discussion of the importance of advertising in American history, the
plurality reviewed the history of its commercial speech jurisprudence. It
noted that the "State retains less regulatory authority when its
commercial speech restrictions strike at the 'substance of the information
communicated'" rather than the "commercial aspect of [it] - with
offerors communicating offers to offerees." 31 2 Moreover, the plurality
appeared to reject the long-held rationale that the "greater hardiness"
and "greater objectivity" of commercial speech justified a more
deferential standard of review.313 Although the Court applied the "less
than strict" standard for commercial speech to the Rhode Island statute,
the Court still held that the statute violated the First Amendment. 4
Subsequent cases continue to formally apply the Central Hudson test;
315however, the government usually loses. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
which involved restrictions on tobacco advertisements in order to protect
children, was perhaps the strongest case for the government. In Lorillard,
I Id. at 473-74. Fox further refined the intermediate scrutiny standard of review for
commercial speech by establishing that the government has the burden to prove a
reasonable "fit" between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends. Id. at 480.
3- 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996). See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and
Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 126 (stating that
"[alfter 44 Liquormart, it is unclear why 'commercial speech' should continue to be treated
as a separate category of speech isolated from general First Amendment principles").
310 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 490.
3" Id. at 495-96.
Id. at 499.
313 Id.
311 Id. at 488, 507.
315 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (compound drug
advertisements); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (tobacco
advertisements); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176
(1999) (casino advertisements).
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the Supreme Court struck down restrictions on outdoor cigar advertising
within one thousand feet of a school, despite the compelling nature of
the state's interest - protecting children's health.316 The Court did so
even after it accepted Massachusetts' showing of a link between
advertising and demand.317  The Supreme Court found that the
regulations were not a "reasonable fit between the means and the ends"
and were overbroad.3 s
B. Restricting Mixed Commercial Speech
The difficulties of defining commercial speech are particularly
apparent when regulations restrict speech that is both concededly
commercial and fully-protected. The test for evaluating this "mix" of
commercial and fully protected speech involves determining whether
the two types of speech are "intertwined." 31 9 A brief review of the mixed
commercial speech case law reveals that, "the difference between
commercial and noncommercial speech is often a 'matter of degree."' 32'
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court
held that a municipal ordinance that prohibited in-person solicitation of
contributions by charitable organizations not using at least 75% of their
receipts for "charitable purposes" violated the First Amendment.321 The
Court dissected the content of the speech at issue, a charitable appeals
for funds.32 The Court also noted that it will treat speech involving a
variety of interests, including interests that are traditionally within the
protection of the First Amendment, as fully protected speech.32 3 The
Court found that the speech communicated information, disseminated
324and propagated views and ideas, and advocated for causes. Because
"solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues," the Court
"' Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555. The Court did uphold a restriction on sales practices for
cigars and chewing tobacco. Id. at 561.
"I Id. at 560.
... Id. at 561.
319 Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
121 Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act,
79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 856 n.209 (1999) (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410,423 (1993)).
321 444 U.S. at 620.
31 Id. at 632.
323 Id.
324 Id.
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treated the solicitation for funds as fully protected speech.23 In rejecting
the argument that the speech was purely commercial, the Court
articulated yet another definition of commercial speech, stating that:
"because charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic
decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information
about the characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has not been
dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely commercial speech."
326
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.
exemplified the general criticism that "[tihe 'inextricably intertwined'
test does not apply where noncommercial speech is simply tacked onto
commercial speech that proposes a commercial transaction."327 In Youngs
Drug, the Supreme Court considered the application of a federal statute
prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of advertising for contraception to a
mailing that included discussions on family planning and venereal
diseases.328 After noting that the advertising contained characteristics of
both commercial and fully protected speech,329 the Court nonetheless
classified the speech as commercial. In doing so, it relied on the
principle that "advertising which 'links a product to a current public
debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded
noncommercial speech."3 °
Similarly, in Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox,
the Supreme Court unraveled the ties between commercial and fully
protected speech. The Court reviewed a university regulation that
prohibited private companies from, inter alia, selling products to
students on campus.33' When the state prevented the defendant
company from selling housewares to students, the defendant argued that
its communication to students was protected by the First Amendment.
The defendant claimed its communications were "inextricably linked"
commercial and fully protected components, which made the entire
speech fully protected.& The Court rejected this argument, stating that:
31 Id. at 633; cf. id. at 639-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that speech at issue
warranted no more protection than commercial speech).
326 Id.
" Bums, supra note 320, at 855 n.208 (citing THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 31:147,31:213 (4th ed. 1997)).
3- 463 U.S. 60, 61-62 (1983).
3 Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
B d. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
332 Id. at 471-72.
Id. at 473-74. The fully protected speech included discussions of financial
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No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell
housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach home
economics without selling housewares. Nothing in the
resolution prevents the speaker from conveying, or the audience
from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the
nature of things requires them to be combined with commercial334
messages.
Relying on Fox, the California Supreme Court recently decided the
high profile case of Kasky v. Nike, Inc. The California Supreme Court
held that Nike's attempts to rebut long-standing allegations about
exploitative labor practices in third world countries through a public
relations campaign was "commercial speech" and thus subject to
intermediate scrutiny. The speech at issue was not advertising of a
particular product, but rather involved a defense of Nike's labor
practices through press releases, letters to newspapers, letters to
university presidents and athletic directors, lobbying efforts, and other
documents aimed at stockholders, policymakers, and the general
public. 337  The majority opinion acknowledged that Nike's speech
involved non-commercial components, including discussions of policy
issues regarding the degree of responsibility domestic companies should
hold for working conditions in factories located in other countries and
the merits and effects of globalization generafly. The opinion,
responsibility and running an efficient home.
334 Id. at 474. The Court distinguished Riley by characterizing the commercial
components of the speech in Riley as required by the government to be part of the non-
commercial speech, thus making the commercial and fully protected speech inextricably
interlinked. Id. The Court did not address Schaumburg, discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 319-26, which did not involve a state mandated intertwining of
commercial and fully protected speech.
3' Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002), modified (May 22, 2002), cert. granted, 537
U.S. 1099 (2002), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). Nike was
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, but then dismissed the case
on the grounds that certiorari had been improvidently granted. In so deciding, however,
the Supreme Court characterized the case as a novel twist on the developing line of mixed-
commercial cases. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 663 (2003) (stating that "[t]his case
presents novel First Amendment questions because the speech at issue represents a
blending of commercial speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public
importance"); cf. id. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that noncommercial and
commercial characteristics of Nike's speech are "inextricably intertwined"); Kasky, 27 Cal.
4th at 975 (Chin, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 992 (Brown, J., dissenting) (same).
" asky, 27 Cal. 4th at 968.
... Id. at 947-48.
33 Id. at 966.
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however, went on to characterize the commercial components of the
speech as containing false and misleading statements, which can be
regulated under California's fraudulent business and false advertising
laws.
339
Some commentators viewed the Nike decision as "highly
questionable," 34° given that the speech at issue could not be easily
characterized as commercial, and in fact, appeared to raise issues of
political and social concern341 The key distinction between Nike and
prior mixed-commercial speech cases, however, revolves around the
allegation that the commercial speech components contain false and
misleading statements.3 Nike is of limited use in analyzing Regulation
FD in light of the lack of any implication that the failure to disclose
material, nonpublic information is fraudulent or deceptive.3 In
addition, whether courts classify speech as commercial or non-
commercial matters less than it used to since the Supreme Court
heightened its level of scrutiny.4
Regulation FD may implicate restrictions on both commercial and
fully protected speech. The inquiry, however, does not end there. In
addition to restricting speech, Regulation FD also compels speech.
C. Compelling Mixed Commercial Speech
Compelling fully protected speech is e ually offensive to the First
Amendment as is restricting such speech. In Wooley v. Maynard, the
Supreme Court affirmed the principle that "[tihe right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
3 Id.
See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 254, § 20:17.
u" Professor O'Neil argues that at least some of the communication in the Nike case
would have been fully protected as political speech before 1976. See Robert M. O'Neil, Nike
v. Kasky - What Might Have Been . .., 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1259, 1261 (2004). He notes
that "[i]t would be ironic in the extreme if a consequence of raising the level of protection
for advertising were to lower or diminish protection for non-advertising corporate
messages." Id. at 1261.
3 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 965 (2002).
See supra note 30.
See supra notes 309-18 and accompanying text.
The right not to speak is well established for individuals whose silence itself
becomes a religious or political statement. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977) (holding that person could not be compelled to display slogan "Live Free or Die");
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that student cannot
be forced to recite Pledge of Allegiance).
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broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind."' '  More recently, the
Court reaffirmed that "the essential thrust of the First Amendment is
to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of
ideas." 347 As a result, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]here is
necessarily and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not
to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of
speech in its affirmative aspect."3
The right not to speak extends to corporations, such as when they are
compelled to give equal "extra space" to the views of third parties. For
example, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the
Supreme Court's plurality opinion held that the government could not
compel a private utility company to include in its billing envelopes
speech with which the utility disagreed because it impermissibly
burdened the utility's First Amendment rights.35° A monthly newsletter
distributed by the utility to its customers in the same envelope as their
monthly bill contained the speech in question. The newsletter contained
straightforward information about utility services and bills, as well as
political editorials, feature stories on matters of public interest, and tips
on conservation.351 The plurality found that the newsletter received the
full protection of the First Amendment because the newsletter extended
"well beyond" speech proposing a business transaction and it included
the kind of discussion of "matters of public concern" that the "First
Amendment both fully protects and implicitly encourages.",
3 2
As Pacific Gas indicates, even if compelled speech contains both
commercial and fully protected components, a court may elect to treat
the speech as fully protected and subject to strict scrutiny. 3 Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina illustrates this.3 In Riley,
the Supreme Court used the First Amendment to strike down a North
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citations omitted).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (citation
omitted).
30 Id.
" See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 6 (1986);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding that right-of-reply
statute that required newspapers to give reply space of equal prominence to those they
editorially criticized violated First Amendment).
475 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion).
' Id. at 5.
352 Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
3 Id.
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 803 (1988).
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Carolina statute requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to
potential donors the percentage of charitable contributions actually
turned over to charity. The Court rejected the argument that the
speech was commercial and, therefore, deserving of less stringent First
Amendment protection. 3  It stated that "we do not believe that the
speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably
intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.-" s7  Based on this
fundamental principle, the Court found that "thus, where, as here, the
component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we
cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and
another test to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial
and impractical. ",35 The Court ultimately found that the disclosure
requirement for professional fundraisers "clearly and substantially
burden[ed]" the protected speech and subjected the state law to
"exacting First Amendment scrutiny."3 9
D. Compelling Commercial Speech
Unlike compelled fully protected speech or mixed commercial speech,
however, compelled pure commercial speech has traditionally enjoyed
less First Amendment protection.36 In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
355 Id.
3% Id. at 795-96.
' Id. at 796. Although Regulation FD's disclosure requirements would sometimes
compel the disclosure of facts, as opposed to opinions, the Supreme Court in Riley drew no
distinction between these types of speech, stating that "either form of compulsion burdens
protected speech." Id. at 797-98.
Id. at 796. In a footnote, the Court stated as follows: "Of course, the dissent's
analogy to the securities field entirely misses the point. Purely commercial speech is more
susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements." Id. at n.9 (affg Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)). Some commentators have interpreted this
footnote as indicating that the Court would view any regulation of the securities industry
as involving purely commercial speech. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 212, at 480. A more
plausible inference, however, is that the Court views at least some regulation of the
securities field as involving purely commercial speech. Regulation FD, however, covers
any "material, nonpublic information," which encompasses much more than commercial
speech. It may also regulate some purely commercial speech, especially when applying
one of the broader definitions. See infra notes 388-409 and accompanying text.
Riley, 487 U.S. at 798. In a similar case, Ill. ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs.,
Inc., the Supreme Court, citing Riley, reaffirmed that the compelled disclosures by
telemarketers of the percentage of commission they received from any charitable donations
violated the First Amendment. 538 U.S. 600, 616-17 (2003).
' See Boyer, supra note 212, at 480-82; Pinto, supra note 212, at 89; see also Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) (stating that state
may require commercial messages to "appear in such a form, or include such additional
University of California, Davis
Counsel,'61 the Supreme Court established that it would review at least
some regulations compelling disclosure of commercial speech by
implicating First Amendment rights under a rational basis type test.2
The Court justified this lower level of scrutiny under the rationale that
"because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an
advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, 'warning[s] or
disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate
the possibility of consumer confusion or deception."'
36
Some commentators feared that compelled commercial speech lost all
First Amendment protection after the Supreme Court's decision .in
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc. In Glickman, the Court held
that federal regulations requiring fruit tree growers, processors, and
handlers to contribute funds for generic advertising promoting
California fruit did not invoke any First Amendment concerns. The
Court distinguished the facts in Glickman from prior compelled speech
cases by noting that the federal regulations did not "compel any person
to engage in any actual or symbolic speech."3 Moreover, the Court
viewed the coerced contributions to collective advertising as part and
parcel of the entire federal regulatory scheme that compels "cooperation
among producers in making economic decisions that would be made
independently in a free market."3
7
In a curious about-face four years after Glickman, the Supreme Court
appeared to expand protection for compelled commercial speech in
information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive")
31 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626 (upholding Ohio Disciplinary Rule requiring attorneys to
disclose in advertising that clients may bear certain expenses, even if they are represented
on contingency-fee basis).
362 Id. at 651 (recognizing "that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech,"
but holding "that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers").
Id. (citation omitted). There are, of course, a plethora of federal and state statutes
which require disclosure of product or other commercial information to prevent fraud or
deception. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2005) (tobacco labeling); 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2004)
(nutritional labeling); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2005) (prescription drug advertisements); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200 (2005) (workplace hazards).
521 U.S. 457 (1997); see also Casarez, supra note 219 (1998) (arguing that Glickman
demonstrates regression in Court's compelled commercial speech jurisprudence).
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 469.
"' Id. at 475.
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Department of Agriculture v. United Foods, Inc.3" In United Foods, the
Supreme Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge to a federal
statute that authorized a federally-established Mushroom Council to
impose mandatory assessments on growers of mushrooms to pay for,
inter alia, generic advertising to promote mushrooms.39 The Court
briefly reviewed its commercial speech jurisprudence, stating that "[a]
quarter of a century ago, the Court held that commercial speech, usually
defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction, is protected by the First Amendment. , 370  After
characterizing the mandatory assessments as compelled contributions to
speech that was commercial in nature, the Court ultimately held that
372the assessment requirement was unconstitutional. In reaching this
holding, the Court appeared to equate commercial speech with other
types of traditionally protected speech, noting that "[tihe commercial
marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a
forum where ideas and information flourish,"' 7 3 and that "[tihe fact that
the speech is in aid of a commercial purpose does not deprive
respondent of all First Amendment protection."
Although United Foods seemed to expand the protection for compelled
commercial speech, it failed to clarify the contours of the compelled
commercial speech doctrine.37' The Court did, however, identify several
important constitutional principles that are relevant to Regulation FD.
First, the Court noted "that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, [should] assess the value of the information presented."
376
In addition, the Court distinguished Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel377 by noting that there was no suggestion that compelling some
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
Id. at 408.
31 Id. at 409 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
" Id. at 410 (citing, in support, host of compelled non-commercial speech cases,
including Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (attorney bar dues); Abood v. Detroit Board. of
Education., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (union dues); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (license
plates); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag salute)).
31 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408.
" Id. at 409 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
311 Id. at 410.
" In the most recent mandatory assessment speech case, the Supreme Court chose to
avoid the compelled corporate speech question by ruling that the marketing program was,
in fact, government speech. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assoc., 125 S.Ct. 2055, 2062 (2005).
31 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411 (citation omitted).
3- 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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mushroom growers to pay for generic advertising was necessary to
prevent consumer deception. 78 Likewise, the SEC does not suggest that
compelling companies to disclose "material, nonpublic information" is
necessary to prevent deception among the investing public. Rule 10b-5
already addresses situations involving deception. Since compelling
corporate speech is not necessary to address real harms, such as investor
deception, the case for compelling such speech at all is greatly weakened.
E. How Should Regulation FD Be Analyzed?
In order to evaluate the First Amendment challenge to Regulation FD,
one must determine the nature of the speech Regulation FD regulates
and the nature of the government regulation. With regard to the latter,
Regulation FD both compels and restricts speech. Regulation FD
compels speech by requiring corporations to disclose to the general
public information which it would rather not disclose (e.g., you must
disclose publicly any privately disclosed material information).
Regulation FD also acts as a content-based restriction on speech by
preventing a company from speaking to select individuals but not to the
public at large (e.g., you may not privately convey material nonpublic
information that is not also made public). In addition, Regulation FD
serves as a content-based burden on speech (e.g., privately conveyed
material nonpublic information is specially burdened by the public
disclosure requirement and the necessity of making a materiality
determination).
Although it is true that Regulation FD only acts as a restriction on
private speech to the extent that a company is unwilling to disclose
nonpublic information publicly, there are legitimate reasons for this.
Professor Donald Langevoort, among others, developed in some detail
reasons why an issuer might reasonably prefer to selectively disclose
information rather than make public disclosures.379 Langevoort notes
first that an issuer will not want to disclose publicly certain kinds of
confidential information, such as information that might give a
competitor an advantage. ° Second, an issuer may also fear liability for
3' United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416.
3 Langevoort, supra note 41, at 1028-31.
Id. at 1029; see also Irani & Karamanou, supra note 170 (noting that companies can
require analysts to use information solely for purpose of forecasting earnings); Robert B.
Thompson & Ronald King, Corporate Accountability: Credibility and Information in Securities
Regulation After Regulation FD, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 615, 620 (2001) (noting issuer will first
want to disclose information that gives it competitive advantage).
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public forward-looking statements that prove incorrecte 1  or for
oversimplified comment, that an expert like an analyst can understand,
but that are difficult for the lay person to process.382 Third, selective
disclosure allows an issuer to bond the accuracy of its information in a
way that simultaneous public disclosure does not allow.3 Finally,
selective disclosure can be used to encourage analysts to devote the
resources necessary to covering the company.' The analystiets a
higher return, whereas the company gets the benefits of coverage.
A further reason for selective disclosure arises when a company wants
nonpublic information to be made public, but does not want to be
associated with the information. For example, a software company
might want to publicize that computer sales will be down in the next
quarter in order to lower earnings expectations for the industry without
drawing particular attention to itself as the forecaster. Informing an
analyst of the forecast would constitute selective disclosure, since the
analyst would know who provided her with the forecast, but the general
public would not necessarily have to know the source of the
information.38 The analyst, however, could better evaluate its reliability.
" This fear should be less than it was when Langevoort was writing, due to the safe
harbor for forward-looking statements contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2004).
' Langevoort, supra note 41, at 1029-30; see also Bushee et al., supra note 192 (finding
that pre-Regulation FD companies with more complex information were more likely to
hold closed conference calls); Gomes et al., supra note 203, at 27 (finding that more complex
firms were more negatively affected by Regulation FD, suggesting that they were better
served by one-on-one interaction); David A. Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Limited
Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting, 36 J. ACCT. AND ECON. 337-86 (2003)
(discussing impact of financial information presentation on market prices); Thompson &
King, supra note 380, at 620 (noting that issuers may have information that general public
will initially misunderstand).
-"3 Langevoort, supra note 41, at 1030.
Id. at 1031; see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading,
Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1270 (2001);
Thompson & King, supra note 380, at 620. Professors Ayres and Choi add that selective
disclosure may "help compensate an investor for taking on the undiversified risk of
assembling a block of shares in situations where the block monitors management for
agency problems." Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 313, 358 (2002). They conclude that "selective disclosures may provide net benefits in
certain specific instances." Id.
' A recent empirical study confirms that Regulation FD has increased the cost of
capital for small firms, in part because fewer analysts now follow them. See Gomes et al.,
supra note 203, at 33. The study found that on average small firms lost 17% of their analyst
following and mid-size firms lost 5%. Id. at 12.
An analyst is unlikely to put much credence in an anonymous email. By contrast,
the public may well give credence to an analysts report on market conditions attributed to
University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:001
Regulation FD would prevent such anonymous speech that, at least in
other contexts, is clearly protected by the First Amendment .
With regard to the nature of the speech, several factors weigh in favor
of not characterizing the speech as commercial, but rather as speech
traditionally protected by the First Amendment. First, a common thread
running through the Court's application of the commercial speech
doctrine is the principle that the First Amendment's concern with
commercial speech is based on the "informational function of
advertising." 3m Of course, although advertising can be commercial
speech, advertising is not necessarily commercial speech.m9 Arguably,
the Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of commercial speech
even further so that it now includes only "the proposal of a commercial
transaction."39 When an issuer informs an existing investor that it will
meet its earning forecasts, it is not proposing an economic transaction
with itself. This applies a fortiori when an issuer informs an analyst of
the same thing. Rather than proposing an economic transaction, the
anonymous sources.
" See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (noting that
"decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to
the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment").
' See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-98 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (reasoning that commercial speech is best understood as speech that merely
advertises product or service for business purposes); see also United States v. Wenger, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (D. Utah 2003) (suggesting that Supreme Court's commercial speech
cases are history of advertising).
Concluding otherwise would "run up against New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and
Buckley v. Valeo, which gave full First Amendment protection to advertisements regarding
issues of public controversy and political campaigns." Kozinski & Banner, supra note 289 at
638. One could add Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), to the list as well.
' City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (noting that
Fox "described the category [of commercial speech] even more narrowly, by characterizing
the proposal of a commercial transaction as 'the test for identifying commercial speech"')
(emphasis added). Those who argue that commercial speech protection should be
expanded to more than the intermediate level of review note that the argument for even
reducing the level of protection to the intermediate standard of review granted by existing
First Amendment doctrine is theoretically sound only as to a limited subclass of
advertising: that subclass of advertising that does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction' .... For it is only the linkage between commercial speech and a commercial
transaction that gives the government the theoretical leverage to presume to regulate the
speech at all . . . . In classic First Amendment terms, however, the one thing that
government may not do is regulate speech because it 'sells' a lifestyles, fantasy, ethos,
identity, or attitude that happens to be regarded by most as socially corrosive. SMOLLA,
supra note 254, § 20:43 (citations omitted). The proposal of no more than a commercial
transaction must also be a proposal for a transaction with the speaker in order to fit
squarely within the commercial speech doctrine.
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issuer is attempting to affect the analyst's Consumer Reports-like
recommendation about the company."'
There is an even narrower concern animating the Court's decision: the
need to prevent "deception" of potential customers of a product or
service by either ensuring disclosure of the necessary information
relating to that product or service392 or prohibiting deceptive
information.393 This is particularly the case in the securities context,
where the federal securities laws require affirmative disclosure to
prevent fraud or deception to the investing public.394  However,
Regulation FD is not aimed at preventing fraud, deception, or curing any
misinformation the public may have about the company or its
securities.39 5  Regulation FD is not even about the advertising or the
396promotion of securities that the company intends to sell. Rather,
Regulation FD is primarily concerned with promoting investor
confidence in the marketplace. Regulation FD affects expression that
exceeds even the most expansive definition of commercial speech as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience. ,398
3. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984) (holding
that expressing opinion about product is protected by First Amendment).
"' See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (disclosure of
information in attorney advertising necessary to prevent deception to public); cf. Dept. of
Agric. v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001) (noting that there was no suggestion that
compelling some mushroom growers to pay for generic advertising is necessary to prevent
consumer misperception).
" Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(stating that government can ban commercial speech that is "more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it").
3 See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (D. Utah 2003) (permitting
compelled disclosure); SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365 (1988) (justifying
compelled disclosure to prevent deception to public).
3" See supra note 30.
3" Regulation FD does not apply to primary offerings. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
3" See infra notes 426-36 and accompanying text.
3" Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (noting expansive definition of commercial speech)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Bruce E. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why
Format, Not Content, Is the Key to Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1243,
1253-54 (2004) (arguing that corporate speech should not be classified as commercial
speech when it concerns company's business operations and is transmitted by media in
form other than paid advertisements); Smolla, supra note 288, at 1281 n.20 (2004) (saying
that there is much to commend this view). We need only mention the concerns of investors
or analysts who are not solely concerned with economic interests, but are also interested in
corporate social responsibility. See generally David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial
Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT.
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In the case of Regulation FD, the characterization of the disclosure of
material, nonpublic information as core commercial speech just does not
fit. Although Regulation FD regulates speech made by corporations,
which often touches upon economic subjects, this does not necessarily
make the speech commercial39 and thus subject to less protection. 4W This
is particularly true where the regulation strikes at "the substance of the
information communicated" rather than the "commercial aspect of [i]t -
with offerors communicating offers to offerees." 4°' Although the
Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart directed this comment at the state's
licensing of liquor retailers, the same analysis applies to the federal
government's regulation of public companies: "Even though
government is under no obligation to provide a person, or the public, a
particular benefit, it does not follow that conferral of the benefit may be
conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional right."412 Corporations
do not surrender all of their First Amendment rights just because they
submit to regulation by the SEC in order to avail themselves of the
public capital markets.
Because the information regulated by federal securities laws, such as
in the case of Regulation FD, does not fit neatly into the category of
advertising a simple commercial transaction, the analytical framework
breaks down.f The Supreme Court in Lowe and the D.C. Circuit in Wall
J. ENvTL. L. 151 (2004) (discussing companies' potential legal obligation to
disclose nonfinancial information); Social Investment Forum, available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (national organization
"promoting the concept, practice and growth of socially responsible investing").
3 See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988) (stating that "[lt is
not clear that a professional's speech is necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that
person's financial motivation for speaking"); Estreicher, supra note 216, at 227 (citing Steven
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1983)).
' See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) ("We thus find no
support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the
proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First
Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation .... " ); accord,
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986); Daniel A. Farber,
Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 382-83 (1979) (stating
that "[elconomic motivation could not be made a disqualifying factor [from maximum
protection] without enormous damage to the first amendment. Little purpose would be
served by a first amendment which failed to protect newspapers, paid public speakers,
political candidates with partially economic motives and professional authors.").
4" 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (citation omitted).
Id. at 513 (citation omitted). See generally, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 passim (1989).
' Commentators have noted that the Supreme Court's focus on advertising as a form
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Street declined to characterize the speech contained in the investment
newsletters as commercialm presumably due in large part to the great
difficulties in trying to squeeze a square peg into a round hole. 40 As the
Supreme Court in Lowe opined, why shouldn't opinions about
marketable securities (or a company's operations) not be fully
protected?4°6
In addition, courts should evaluate the speech that Regulation FD
seeks to affect as a whole, based on the standard set forth in the Supreme
Court's opinions in Riley and Schaumburg. 4 7  Although some speech
captured by Regulation FD may involve explicit promotions of a
corporate security,4 the Regulation may also trench upon fully
protected speech, which will have little, if any, promotional value for the
company or its stock. "Material, nonpublic" information may not only
involve economic subjects, but the speech may also-'concern corporate
attitudes toward or involvement with world events, political
happenings, and other issues which may affect a company's business.4
of commercial speech cannot be easily analogized to federal securities laws. See Dooley,
supra note 217, at 336. While a 1933 Act prospectus may be analogized to an advertisement
of the securities described therein, "the analogy becomes strained in the case of an annual
proxy statement, where there is typically little in the way of 'campaign advertising' for
uncontested director seats, and falls apart in the case of the period reporting requirements
of the 1934 Act." Id.
4 See infra Part Il.A.1-2.
" See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993)
(recognizing "the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial
speech in a distinct category"); Estreicher, supra note 216, at 225 (arguing that current
commercial speech jurisprudence is effectively ad hoc line drawing).
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,210 n.58 (1985).
See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1987) (stating that "where, as
here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel
out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase. Such an
endeavor would be both artificial and impractical."); see also Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980); Krotoszynski, supra note 287, at 1212-22 (arguing for
intent test for distinguishing whether mixed speech is commercial or noncommercial). But
see Bd. of Trustees of State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
For example, a company might suggest to an investor that she should buy its
securities because it was going to hit its earnings forecasts. Even this does not fit exactly as
the proposal of a commercial transaction, unless the company is selling the security itself
rather than promoting its purchase in the open market.
Although the promotional advertising in Central Hudson was only afforded limited
protection under the commercial speech doctrine, the majority opinion noted that the ban
excluded institutional and informational messages and that utilities enjoy the full panoply
of First Amendment protections for their direct comments on public issues. Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980). Regulation FD does
not carve out institutional or informational messages, or direct comments on public issues.
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For example, an executive may want to comment privately on the
general state of the economy and the President's policies, how the war in
Iraq might affect business, whether privatizing social security is
desirable, or how companies may react to a Medicare drug benefit.
Regulation FD acts both to restrict speech (to private audiences) and to
compel speech (to the public). Regulation FD arguably affects
commercial speech and definitely affects noncommercial protected
speech. How then should the appropriate standard of review be
applied?
IV. APPLYING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
As described above, Regulation FD is a peculiar hybrid. It can restrict,
burden, or compel commercial, noncommercial, or mixed speech.
Theoretically, depending on how it chose to weigh the Supreme Court's• 411
precedents, a court could apply rational review, intermediate Central
Hudson review,41' or strict scrutiny.412 Regardless of the standard of
review, a court would analyze the nature of the government's interest
and how well the regulation relates to or fits the interest. Because a court
should not apply only rational review (and if it did, the SEC would
undoubtedly prevail) this section examines the interests and fit in light of
intermediate and strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, Regulation FD may persist only if it is narrowly
tailored to achieve compelling government interests. Under Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny, the government must assert a substantial
interest; Regulation FD must directly advance the governmental interest
involved and must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that
• 414
interest. As noted above, because the Supreme Court applies Central
Hudson with teeth,4 5 the intermediate scrutiny test is not as different
... Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (compelled
commercial). But see Dept. of Agric. v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
411 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557 (restricted commercial).
412 Riley, 487 U.S. 781; Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620 (1980) (addressing compelled or
restricted non-commercial or mixed speech). Of course, a court could also invent a new
standard of review. See Nike v. Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002).
413 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) (discussing strict
scrutiny test in context of political contributions by corporations). This strict scrutiny test
has been set forth in numerous First Amendment Cases. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
414 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (applying Central Hudson).
415 See supra notes 309-18 and accompanying text.
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from the strict scrutiny test as the bare language might suggest.
A. Government Interests?
Both standards of review require the court to ask itself whether,
normatively, the government's interest is "important enough to justify a
speech restriction?" 416 The SEC advances three main interests to justify
Regulation FD. A court could find that these justifications are
compelling and should find that they are substantial.
The first justification is somewhat of a moral argument. Arthur Levitt
stated that selective disclosure "is a stain on our markets . . . [that]
undermines the fundamental principle of fairness." 41 7 The SEC believes
that it is unfair if "other participants may exploit 'unerodable
informational advantages' derived not from hard work or insights, but
from their access to corporate insiders" in order to profit from stock
trading.18 Regulation FD was thus intended to level the playing field.
This closely resembles the parity of information theory. Until Regulation
FD, U.S. securities laws mandated parity of required information rather
than parity of all material information.
The Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks rejected a parity of all
419
material information approach. In Chiarella, the Court suggested that
imposing such a theory would "depart radically from established
doctrine"420 and that to do so would require explicit congressional
intent.421 In Dirks, the Court reiterated that an absolute equal information
,, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996).
... Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, Address Before the Economic Club of New York:
Quality Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets (Oct. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm.
41' Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(quoting United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (citing Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV.
322,356 (1979))).
419 Both Chiarella and Dirks denied SEC authority to impose equal information rule
under sections 17 and 10(b). Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1980).
'o Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. The Court was overruling the Second Circuit which had
stated that anyone who "regularly receives material nonpublic information" could not use
the information for trading. Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1365 (2d Cir. 1978)).
... Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233; see also Commissioner Laura S. Unger, SEC Commissioner,
Remarks at U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission Glasser LegalWorks Conference on
SEC Regulation FD: Fallout from Regulation FD: Has the SEC Finally Cut the Tightrope?
(Oct. 27, 2000) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm ("I am all for
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rule would be "a radical view of securities trading."42 The Court also
observed that analysts often obtain information directly from an issuer's
officers and that "[i]t is the nature of this type of information, and indeed
of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made
simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the
public generally."4
The Supreme Court is not alone in rejecting the parity of information
approach. Academics, starting with Henry Manne, consistently reject
the proposition that trading with an unerodable informational advantage
is unfair. 4  Professor Ian Lee summarized the myriad objections to the
parity of information theory: "insider trading is a victimless crime;...
equality of information is inconsistent with the inegalitarianism inherent
in the securities market; . . .mandatory information sharing would
undermine incentives to search for information; and ... a mandatory
rule against insider trading harms outside shareholders by preventing
them from concluding the bargains they prefer."4
The second interest put forth by the SEC is the market-related
contention that "the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of
investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets." 426 A loss of
confidence would then result in less participation in the market and,
therefore, decreased liquidity.2 7 Regulation FD can be compared to the
more information - meaningful information - but ensuring parity of information is not
the SEC's mandate.").
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.16.
Id. at 658-59.
414 HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93 (1966) (arguing that
insider trading does not harm investors and thus cannot be unfair).
Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, 158 (2002); see
also Fox, supra note 55, at 656 ("selective disclosure does not appropriately raise fairness
concerns"); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the
Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443,478 (2001) (arguing that parity
of information theory is "not only unworkable, but nonsensical," since there is no clear
distinction between erodable and unerodable informational advantage); Alan Strudler &
Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEx. L. REV. 375, 405 (1999)
(citations omitted) ("an intuitive sense of fairness is too vague and unreliable to serve as a
basis of legal decision making").
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
More precisely, it is the rapid price changes of a security in advance of public information,
rather than selective disclosure itself, that would cause the projected loss of confidence. Id.
This necessarily requires conduct (e.g., trading in the security).
" The SEC also argued that increased liquidity would result from lower stock market
transaction costs attributable to the elimination of selective disclosure. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,731 (Aug. 24, 2000) (citations
omitted) ("Economic theory and empirical studies have shown that stock market
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broad, prophylactic rule in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, which
compelled the disclosure of financial information by professional
fundraisers. The statute in Riley attempted to cure donor
misperception by compelling professional fundraisers to provide donors
with more financial information regarding the donors' potential
429donations to particular charities. Similarly, Regulation FD attempts to
preserve investor confidence by compelling corporations to disclose to
the public material, nonpublic information (or preventing them from
disclosing this information) regarding the companies in which investors
may potentially purchase securities. Notably, the Supreme Court in
Riley found that the state's interest in dispelling the donors' "alleged
misperception" was not as "weighty" as the government asserted. °
For this interest at least, the SEC has some support from the Supreme
Court. In United States v. O'Hagan, the Court asserted that even though
"informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets," trading
on misappropriated information would have an "inhibiting impact on
market participation."431  The Court also noted that "an animating
purpose of the Exchange Act [is] to ensure honest markets and thereby
promote investor confidence." 432
Reduced liquidity, of course, is not the only issue. Market efficiency,
essentially meaning accurate pricing, is also important, and it is unclear
whether selective disclosure increases or decreases efficiency.4n To the
transaction costs increase when certain traders may be aware of material, undisclosed
information. A reduction in these costs should make investors more willing to commit
their capital.").
"4 "Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of
regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.
4w Id.
431 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997). It is perhaps no coincidence that the "O'Hagan decision
has been swamped by a flood of critical articles." Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation
Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of
United States v. O'Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 866 (citing 15 critical articles).
Market participation is probably better understood as fewer trades, rather than less
investment. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 36, at 36.
432 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
" See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 630-32 (1984) (less efficient); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading
and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565-76 (1970) (more efficient). See also Arya et
al., supra note 15 (providing model of how Regulation FD may lead to increased
inefficiency).
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degree that Regulation FD increases volatility,4m it may actually reduce
confidence in the market.4 3 Even if promoting confidence in the market
is a compelling or substantial interest, courts should weigh it against
other desirable interests. Even under the Central Hudson test, a court
must consider all relevant government interests.4
The third justification propounded by the SEC depends on the possible
effects of selective disclosure on the parties directly involved. For the
issuer, there is the possibility that corporate management may misuse
the selective disclosure of information as a bribe to influence or reward
particular investors or market professionals. 437 For the analysts receiving
information, there is the fear that analysts will bias their reports in order
to retain company favor.438 Although the SEC does not say this, for the
information to function as a bribe or to bias reports, it must have value,
which ultimately will depend on whether a recipient can profitably trade
on the information (or write a report that will allow others to trade).
Notably, some academic literature shows that as long as there are
multiple informed traders, as is the case when a company selectively
discloses the same information simultaneously to several market
professionals, the expected trading profit is actually nil.439
Here too, preventing the misuse of information is not the only interest.
The SEC is also interested in analysts functioning effectively. In Dirks,
the Supreme Court stated that the SEC recognizes that analysts are
'3 See Talosig, supra note 13, at 396; see also Robert E. Pinsker, Individual Investors'
Overreactions to Information Presented in Accordance with Regulation FD:
Addressing Some Research Gaps in the Laboratory (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=588948 (presenting results of laboratory investigation suggesting
that disclosure patterns resulting from Regulation FD may harm unsophisticated investors
in part due to excess volatility). See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
' Although investors love to see their securities increase rapidly in price, generally
they hate it even more when their securities decline rapidly in price. See, e.g., Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Increased volatility results in investors requiring a higher risk
premium, and increases uncertainty by raising the probability of government interference.
See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Market Volatility: Causes and Consequences, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
953, 956 (1989).
436 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002) (comparing
government's stated interest in effectiveness of drug approval program with government's
interest in allowing patients to get needed medications).
,31 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716-17 (Aug. 24,
2000).
438 Id.
131 See F. Douglas Foster & S. Viswanathan, Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast The
Forecasts of Others, 51 J. FIN. 1437 (1996); Craig W. Holden & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam,
Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition, 47 J. FIN. 247 (1992).
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"necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."44° Mo recently, the
SEC acknowledged that a company's market capitalization and public
float "are closely and positively associated with the number of analysts
that follow firms." 441 In July 2005, the SEC accepted that "[t]he value of
[analysts'l research reports in continuing to provide the market and
investors with information about reporting issuers cannot be
disputed."42 Regulation FD may harm the functioning of analysts and
thus the market if it results in reports conveying less accurate or useful
information."3
Finally, evidence of under-inclusiveness implies that the government's
interest is not compelling. A regulation's underinclusiveness "suggests
that the government itself doesn't see the interest as compelling enough
to justify a broader statute."4" Regulation FD is underinclusive, as
discussed below in Part IV.B.1.
B. How Does Regulation FD Relate to the SEC's Interests?
A court may or may not find that the government's interests are
compelling. In any case, a court is more likely to strike down Regulation
FD due to its weak relation to the SEC's interest.45 The SEC must show
that Regulation FD actually does advance its legitimate interests.4
Leaving aside the contested interest of the market's fairness or
perceived fairness, with respect to the second interest, the proposition
that insider trading results in less market participation is dubious.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (emphasis added).
41 The Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,185 n.79 (Dec. 4, 1998);
see also Securities Offering Reform, Release Nos. 33-8591, 34-52,056, IC-26,993, 70 Fed Reg.
44,722, 44,728 (July 19, 2005) ("[high levels of analyst coverage ... are useful indicators of
the scrutiny that an issuer receives from the market").
4 Securities Offering Reform, Release Nos. 33-8591, 34-52,056, IC-26,993, 70 Fed Reg.
44,722, 44,761 (July 19, 2005).
' See e.g., Arya et al., supra note 15; Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Response to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 49-51 (2002)
(listing several ways that Regulation FD may reduce effectiveness of analysts); Jeff D.
Opdyke, SEC Discuss "Reg FD" at Roundtable, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2001, at C16 (noting that
analysts at SEC roundtable complained of significant reduction in quality of corporate
disclosure after Regulation FD). See also supra notes 163-82 and accompanying text. Of
course, some commentators have argued that analyst distortions "currently are more likely
to decrease market efficiency than increase it." See Fisch & Sale, supra note 14, at 1086.
' Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980); Volokh, supra note 416, at 2420 (citing Fla.
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment)).
' Volokh, supra note 416, at 2421 ("Most cases striking down speech restrictions ...
rely primarily on the narrow tailoring prong .. .
" Id. at 2422.
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Professor Larry Ribstein noted several weaknesses in the theory, 7 such
as how unclear rules against insider trading could reduce legitimate
outsider trading and thereby reduce liquidity."8 Professor Stephen
Bainbridge concluded that the robust stock market performance
observed following high-profile insider trading episodes undercuts the
theory.449  Another commentator, Stanislav Dolgopolov, noted that
neither corporations, which would benefit from increased liquidity by a
lower cost of capital, nor market makers, which are claimed to raise the
bid-asked spread to cover the costs of insider trading thereby reducing
liquidity, objected to insider trading, thus raising doubts about the
proposition. The empirical evidence appears both "limited and
mixed."4 1 In addition, if Regulation FD leads to a less efficient market,
that too could reduce market participation and liquidity.42
The SEC's third interest, the possibility of the misuse of information, 4
with respect to analysts can be addressed by the marketplace. Analysts
are only valuable to the degree that they provide accurate information.
,' Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 163-66
(1998).
Id. at 164.
" See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 786 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit DeGeest eds., 1998) available at
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5650book.pdf; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the
Animal Spirits of the Stock Market: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 135, 166 (2002) (noting that "the long-standing increase in retail investor participation
in the U.S. markets at a time when selective disclosure was a notorious practice indicates"
that withdrawal is unlikely).
' See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation
of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 108-09 (2004).
" Krawiec, supra note 425, at 469; see also Dolgopolow, supra note 450, at 105 n.108
(2004) (citing studies that contradict adverse selection model).
"2 See, e.g., Arya et al., supra note 15, at 11; Mathew, supra note 203, at 18 (finding that
"implementation of [Regulation FD] has not been without its increase in trading costs to
small investors" and has resulted in reduced liquidity). Jim Hsieh and colleagues provide
additional evidence of the potentially perverse impact of Regulation FD. They compared
the informational value of insider trades with analyst recommendations, and found that in
the 2000-2003 period buys by insiders were even more profitable and thus reflected greater
nonpublic information than in the 1994-1999 period. Jim Hsieh et al., How Informative Are
Analyst Recommendations and Insider Trades?, AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, 20-21 (2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=687584; see also Mark Hulbert, The Analysts vs. the Insiders, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at C3.
... Management may be misusing information in other ways. Professor Jagolinzer
found evidence suggesting that management with Rule 10b5-1 plans "profit from
information-based trade." Alan D. Jagolinzer, An Analysis of Insiders' Information-based
Trade within the SEC Rule 10b5-1 Safe Harbor 2 (Jan. 6, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=541502. One explanation for this is that insiders alter the timing
or quality of company disclosures to earn extra market returns. Id. at 3.
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As one court put it, "the analyst's reputation and livelihood depend
solely on the analyst's ability to be correct." Over time, generally
efficient U.S. markets will reveal these inaccurate analysts, and the
market should discount their forecasts. s  Accurate and unbiased
analysts should thus defeat "bribed" and "slanted" analysts. 4 16 Cutting
somewhat against the efficient market argument, however, but also
cutting against the utility of Regulation FD, it appears that Regulation
FD's existence has failed to stop companies' attempts to influence
analysts.47  Clearly, there are other sources of bias among analysts
besides selective disclosure.
The argument that the SEC has an interest in preventing management
from rewarding particular investors is more compelling because the
market response is less obvious and there are no clear benefits to the
company or the market.45' Investors have no easy way of knowing
whether management rewards a particular group of investors.
Furthermore, the possibility of collusion between bribed investors and
management is not trivial. The market response to this problem might
simply be for investors to demand a higher return from those companies
with a greater degree of concentration of ownership.6 This response
41 In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1481 (N.D. Cal. 1992); cf. Harrison Hong
& Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58
J. FIN. 313 (2003), available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-jgsfss/Hong.pdf (finding that
favorable career outcomes are linked to past accurate forecasts).
I See Wang, supra note 55, at 883 n.72; see also Langevoort, supra note 449, at 152 ("If
investors are smart enough to anticipate the biases or the flaws [of analysts' reports], they
will discount or ignore the recommendations."); Qi Chen et al., Investor Learning About
Analyst Predictive Ability, 39 J. ACcOUNTING & EcON. 3, 4 (2005) (listing studies that have
found that "investors attach higher weights to forecasts or stock recommendations issued
by superior analysts," and also finding that investors put more weight on accuracy of
analysts' recent forecasts).
' Ribstein, supra note 16.
" See Thompson & King, supra note 380, at 629; see, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, You'll
Never Do Research in This Town Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2005, at C3 (stating that "there
may be another explanation for analysts' unreasoned optimism: fear of retaliation from the
companies they follow"). Analysts may also have conflicting interests due to their
employment.
Management presumably is prepared to reward particular investors as a quid pro
quo for those investors supporting management.
See Choi, supra note 152, at 559-64.
See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary
Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 144, 146 (2005). Companies with a greater
concentration of ownership would then have a higher cost of capital. If this were truly a
problem, however, they could address this higher cost by publicly committing not to
selectively disclose information.
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rests on the theory that the more widely dispersed share ownership is,
the less likely that bribery (or incentivizing) is taking place.4 11 After all,
corporate management has fewer reasons to bribe smaller investors. Of
course, investors may also respond by trading less frequently, since an
investor can only be on the wrong side of a trade to a better-informed
investor if she trades.462
It is also worth noting that the SEC did not provide much justification
for the belief that selective disclosure is a major cause of the problems
that Regulation FD purports to solve.4 Rather, the SEC merely adverted
to some media reports suggesting that the practice of selective disclosure
occurred and the perceptions of SEC employees regarding this
practice. The SEC appears to have ignored evidence suggesting that
any problem with selective disclosure was decreasing, in that more
companies were holding their conference calls 
publicly.§
Under Central Hudson, the SEC must also show that Regulation FD is
"not more extensive than is necessary to serve [its] interests."46 If,
however, "the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government
must do so."467  Under strict scrutiny, the SEC must show narrow
tailoring. As Professor Eugene Volokh describes, a law is not narrowly
tailored if it is not the least restrictive alternative, meaning "if there are
less speech-restrictive means available that would serve the interest
essentially as well as would the speech restriction."4 A law also is not
narrowly tailored if it is underinclusive, meaning that it "fails to restrict a
significant amount of speech that harms the government interest to
about the same degree as does the restricted speech."469
41 See id. at 147-48, 161-62 (listing reasons why insider trading might be linked to
ownership concentration and finding empirical support).
4" See Georgakopoulos, supra note 36, at 36.
The government bears the burden of proof under both standards of review. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002) (citations omitted).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,717 (Aug. 24, 2000).
The SEC even acknowledged that the media reports did not indicate necessarily that
selective disclosure had occurred.
1 Id. at 51,717-18.
1 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
47 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
' Volokh, supra note 416, at 2422 (citations omitted). He also explains how the least
restrictive alternative can include whether the law actually promotes the interest and
whether the law is overinclusive. Id. at 2423.
Id. at 2424 (citations omitted).
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It is worth re-emphasizing that the SEC's primary interests for
Regulation FD are to preserve fairness and confidence in the market, but
that Regulation FD targets speech itself and not the trading resulting
from the speech.470 The mere fact that some people have more
information than others, however, is neither surprising nor
objectionable. People may lose confidence in the markets when they
believe others are taking advantage of information that they both do not
have and cannot get (i.e., information derived by way of the trader's
position and access, rather than skill and hard work). Taking advantage
in this context, however, necessarily requires trading on the material,
nonpublic information, either directly or based on an analysts'
recommendation.47' Otherwise, there is no advantage to be gained from
receiving information unavailable to others. Selective disclosure is not
the problem - if there is a problem, it is trading based on selective
disclosure.4 3 In simple campaign slogan terms, "it's the trading,
stupid!"
473
1. Regulation FD's Scope
Is Regulation FD the least restrictive alternative or no more extensive
than necessary? Put differently, is Regulation FD so overinclusive that it
restricts, burdens, or compels speech that is irrelevant to the SEC's
purposes?474 In addition, are there alternative approaches that would
serve the SEC's purposes adequately but have less impact on a
"0 Even the SEC's third justification regarding the misuse of selective disclosure to
reward or influence market professionals ultimately depends upon trading. The
information has value only to the degree that it can be traded on by someone, whether it is
the investors themselves or the analysts' clients.
' "Taking advantage" could also refer to refraining from trading in the particular
stock or to trading in substitutes, but since Regulation FD allows the confidentiality carve
out, which permits such action or inaction, this is not the SEC's concern. See infra notes
506-11 and accompanying text.
" The SEC effectively acknowledged this distinction. See Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) ("[Slelective disclosure has the
immediate effect of enabling those privy to the information to make a quick profit (or
quickly minimize losses) by trading before the information is disseminated to the public.").
" This is a paraphrase of Bill Clinton's informal campaign slogan in 1992. See, e.g.,
Mark Gongloff, Is It Still the Economy, Stupid?, MONEY, Sept. 26, 2003, 1.
'7' FEC v. Nat'l. Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978); Volokh, supra note 416, at 2422 n.32 (citing
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120-21
(1991)).
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company's speech?475
a. Overinclusiveness
Regulation FD is over-inclusive in the sense that all of the material
nonpublic information that it targets is assumed to result in the harm of
trading. In fact, it captures speech that does not result in trading and
thus may not result in harm.4 Although subsequent trading is evidence
of materiality, the SEC does not need to prove that any trading took
place to find a violation of Regulation FD.
The SEC argues that Regulation FD is not overinclusive, since a
recipient of information who does not intend to trade can agree to keep
the information confidential (thereby creating a duty that would
implicate the existing insider trading regime). Why, asks the SEC,
would a recipient who does not intend to trade on the information not
agree to confidentiality? 478 Actually, even such a recipient will likely be
unwilling to agree, "given the uncertain scope and duration of
limitations on their freedom of action."479  For example, it will not
' Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538
(1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn.
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983); Volokh, supra note 416, at 2423 n.33 (citing
Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990)); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.,
535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002) (listing non-speech related means that government could use to
advance its interests). Volokh also adds that a regulation is not the least restrictive
alternative if it does not advance the government's interest. Volokh, supra note 416, at 2422.
Failing to advance the government's interest is also the third prong of Central Hudson,
where "the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support." See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Publ. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66
(1980). If Regulation FD actually reduces the quality or quantity of information getting to
the market, thereby resulting in a less efficient and more volatile market, this would
presumably reduce investor confidence in the market. The SEC accepted that Regulation
FD may have a "chilling effect" on issuers' disclosure of information. Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000). With respect to issuers
using information as a bribe, since the pre-Regulation FD insider trading regime already
prevented insiders from disclosing information for personal gain, selective disclosure is
largely performed to benefit the company, which should result in an increase in the
company's value. Investors would normally prefer this state of affairs.
476 The SEC's third interest (preventing use of information as a bribe to bias analysts) is
not implicated, since the same result is achieved by means of the carve out for
confidentiality agreements.
,' SEC Opposition, supra note 265, at 25.
M Id.
" Letter from Securities Industry Association to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC, supra
note 10 (stating that Securities Industry Association believes that institutional investors
will only be willing to sign confidentiality agreements in "exceptionally unusual
circumstances").
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necessarily be clear when or how an issuer will plan to disclose the
information publicly or, if the issuer uses a different combination of
words or different body language,4 whether enough of the information
was disclosed.
A second reason Regulation FD is overinclusive is that under Rule
10b-5(1), which the SEC introduced concurrently with Regulation FD,
trading "on the basis of" material nonpublic information now occurs
whenever the trader is aware that she has material nonpublic1 482
information,48  subject to a few limited exceptions. A recipient's
possession of the information is sufficient - use need not be shown.48'
Thus, a recipient who receives material nonpublic information tending to
show that a security should be sold and then performs an independent
analysis to reach the same conclusion would be unable to sell simply
by virtue of her possession of the nonpublic information. This is true
even though she would make the same decision regardless of her
48 See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
481 The rule reads in relevant part:
(b) Definition of 'on the basis of.' Subject to the affirmative defenses in
paragraph (c) of this section, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is 'on the
basis of' material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the
person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic
information when the person made the purchase or sale.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2005).
482 Transactions involving pre-existing plans, contracts, or instructions that the trader
entered into in good faith are excluded. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c). See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater,
Witness Tells of Early Talk of Plan to Sell Stewart Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at Cl
(explaining importance in (in)famous Martha Stewart case of defendant's argument that
she had previously issued instruction to sell Imclone stock if it fell below $60).
" Rule 10b5-1 forestalls the argument that even though the trader had material
nonpublic information, she would have made the trade anyways. Put slightly differently,
there is now no need to show but-for causation (i.e., but-for the trader's knowledge of the
material nonpublic information, she would not have traded) or even that the material
nonpublic information was a factor in the decision. The argument that use of the
information was necessary had previously been accepted by the Ninth and Eleventh
circuits. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1071 (1999); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998). The SEC and academic
commentators had often argued the opposite, usually on evidentiary grounds. See, e.g.,
Adler, 137 F.3d at 1332-33 (stating SEC advocated that mere possession of information,
regardless of use, was adequate to establish liability); DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER
TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 3.123 (2005).
Technically, it does not matter whether a recipient's independent analysis points in
the same direction as the material nonpublic information she received. Either way, she is
prohibited from both buying and selling, regardless of whether the material nonpublic
information is positive or negative for the company's securities.
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possession of the information. Likewise, if she hears negative rumors
about the issuer in the marketplace, she still cannot trade because rumors
are not as accurate as direct comments from the issuer, and thus, the
information could still be considered nonpublic.4'
Trading on inappropriately received information is the harm that
Regulation FD really seeks to address. The selective disclosure of
information, without trading, is not itself harmful. Given this, directly
targeting speech rather than presumed undesirable trading is inevitably
overinclusive, as not all speech will result in trading.
b. Other Approaches
If one believes that reducing insider trading serves the SEC's
interests4 6 and that this is not outweighed by the harm to other interests,
are there alternative approaches that adequately serve the SEC's interests
but place fewer restrictions on speech? "If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last, not first,
resort. " 487 For example, in Riley, the Supreme Court provided examples
of more narrowly tailored rules than the "prophylactic, imprecise, and
unduly burdensome rule the State" adopted.4
The key is that the perceived harm results not from selective disclosure
per se, but from the trading that may result from such disclosure.4 8 9 As
the Supreme Court noted in Dirks, "[it is important in this type of case to
focus on policing insiders and what they do... rather than on policing
information per se and its possession ....",,490 The SEC or Congress
should instead focus on the alleged harm - trading - without
implicating the First Amendment.49'
In both cases she possessed material nonpublic information, but may not have used
it.
One must also believe that the interest is not adequately served by the SEC's existing
narrowly tailored regulation against insider trading, Rule lob-5.
' Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002) (applying Central Hudson).
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1987).
' Rule lob-5 already targets other kinds of insider trading. See supra notes 38-47 and
accompanying text.
4 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-63 (1983) (citations omitted).
" For those who respond with the dubious assertion that attacking the speech is easier
than attacking the trading, it is worth remembering that, at least in the equal protection
context, administrative efficiency is not an acceptable state compelling interest. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989); see also Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n.9 (1972). ("small administrative convenience" in First
Amendment case is not compelling interest).
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One possible alternative is for the SEC to introduce a fraud-based
regulation clarifying the "personal benefit" test of Dirks. For example,
Harvey Goldschmid, SEC General Counsel, when the Proposing Release
was issued, believed that the SEC could lawfully extend the Dirks benefit
test to apply to trading that resulted from disclosures benefiting the
492issuer. Trading that resulted from selective disclosure would then
become a part of the Rule 10b-5 insider trading regime. Goldschmid,
however, did not support this approach, because "the fraud stigma,
private action, and treble-damage disgorgement, would be available to
plaintiffs and could have had a large chilling effect on
communication."4 9 3 Although a case-based extension might suffer from
this result, a rule-based extension could modify the availability of
remedies to plaintiffs.
If the SEC's interests are as important as it argues, an even better
approach is for Congress to legislate against the trading resulting from
selective disclosure.494 Although the SEC may lack the authority to target
the type of trading at issue, Congress clearly does not. For example, in
Lowe, Justice White's concurrence noted that "there is no suggestion that
the application of the antifraud provisions of the [Investment Advisers]
Act... would present serious First Amendment difficulties." 495 Similarly
there is no suggestion that Congress cannot regulate the trading of
securities by broadening the definition of impermissible insider
trading,49 6 even if Congressional restrictions on possibly unrelated
speech would be prohibited by the First Amendment.
Alternatively the SEC might simply encourage firms to commit to and
explain their own selective disclosure policies.497  As Professor Choi
" Panel Discussion: The SEC's Regulation FD, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 273, 279
(2001) (remarks of Harvey J. Goldschmid). The Supreme Court's suggestions in Riley for
less restrictive alternatives than compelling speech included the vigorous enforcement of
antifraud laws. Riley, 487 U.S. at 800.
" Panel Discussion: The SEC's Regulation FD, supra note 492, at 279.
9 Congress does not necessarily have to be the body that takes action. See Ribstein,
supra note 447, at 154-66 (arguing persuasively in favor of leaving much of regulation of
insider trading to states rather than to Congress). Alternatively, control of trading could be
assigned to the issuers. See Ayres & Choi, supra note 384 at 370-402.
4 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 225 (1985) (citations omitted).
4 Australia's insider trading regime serves as an example. Subject to a few limited
exceptions, Australia prohibits almost everyone from trading who possesses information
that is not generally available. Corporations Act, 2001, § 1043A (Austl.).
' See Choi, supra note 152, at 574-78 (explaining advantages of firms committing to
selective disclosure policies). Choi also suggests a shift from the existing system of
periodic disclosure to current or continuous disclosure. Id. at 569-74. Such a shift may
have fewer First Amendment implications. See supra note 26 (discussing First Amendment
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explained, especially at the time of an initial public offering, firm owners
have an incentive to maximize the value of their company and are
therefore likely to choose a wealth-maximizing policy,48 which should
address liquidity concerns. In addition, it is hard for an investor to
perceive unfairness when warned in advance of how a company will use
its information.
2. Underinclusive
In addition to being overinclusive, Regulation FD is startlingly
underinclusive in relation to its purpose of promoting fairness and
investor confidence.49 The following situations are likely untouched by
Regulation FD (and the existing insider trading regime). Each scenario
could result in those with access to inside information taking advantage
of such information, thus potentially impairing investor confidence if
one accepts the SEC's logic.
Part I.A.1 described how the adopted version of Regulation FD does
not apply to all issuers. Selective disclosures by foreign private issuers
and foreign governments are not covered."' Professor Merritt Fox
argues persuasively that if the trading from selective disclosure is
appropriately considered unfair, then Regulation FD should also apply
concerns of periodic reporting). The SEC first accepted this principle of current disclosure
in 1980, but it never acted on it. See Stephen E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to
Update and Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7
STAN. J.L. Bus & FIN. 225,240-46 (2002); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a
Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Companies: "Are We There Yet?," 20
CARDOZO L. REv. 135, 148-49 (1998).
... See Choi, supra note 152, at 574.
' This is an inevitable result of the narrowing of the scope of Regulation FD that took
place between its proposal and adoption. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718-19 (Aug. 24, 2000) (describing narrowing revisions).
Underinclusiveness is less relevant for the Central Hudson test.
5 Of course, Regulation FD also does not apply to all types of material nonpublic
information, such as information received from lower level employees who do not
regularly speak with analysts. It also does not apply to information transmitted in the
ordinary course of business to vendors or suppliers or to information transmitted to other
groups, such as the media or business partners. Concededly the recipients of information
in these circumstances may not trade much, or in some circumstances, trading might be
reached by the misappropriation theory accepted in O'Hagan. Regulation FD also does not
apply to information conveyed to potential investors who are not yet holders of an issuer's
securities regardless of how likely it is that they will trade.
"01 See supra text accompanying notes 56-58 for information on the importance of
foreign issuers.
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502to foreign issuers.
Furthermore, Regulation FD does not apply to some situations where
trading is likely. The SEC chose not to apply Regulation FD to issuers in
most Securities Act offerings. Since material nonpublic information is
commonly given orally at road shows that may well be invitation-only
o3
this is exactly the type of so-called "unfairness" that should be
addressed. Similarly, underwriters with an information advantage are
permitted to buy or sell shares to stabilize the price after an initial public
offering.so
Regulation FD also does not apply to the negligent issuer. It is not
clear that there is any less unfairness or perceived unfairness when the
supranormal returns of trading with inside information result from an
issuer's negligence rather than recklessness.s0 s  Put differently, an
outsider on the unprofitable side of a trade is unlikely to care about the
subtle distinctions in the issuer's agent's mental state.
In addition, Regulation FD does not prevent refraining from trading.
0 6
An investor can refrain from trading or the analyst can refrain from
changing their recommendations due to material nonpublic information
he or she receives, if the parties agree to a confidentiality agreement.
o7
Fox, supra note 55, at 668-69.
See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REv.
711,730-31 (2005) (noting that individual investors are generally excluded from some types
of road shows and that they generally have less information). Google's recent follow-on
offering may also illustrate this point. Google's share price had risen sharply after the
announcement of the offering, resulting in speculation that the road shows, closed to the
general public, were revealing new market-moving information. See Saul Hansell, Investors
Rush to Buy Another $4.2 Billion in Google Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at Cl.
See Thompson & King, supra note 380, at 636 (citing Regulation M, 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.104 (2000)).
See Krawiec, supra note 425, at 479.
See generally Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455 (2003). Professor
Fried has argued that contrary to the conventional view, the ability to refrain from trading
does not actually allow the insider to earn higher trading profits than a comparably
situated public shareholder. Fried's argument, however, depends on insiders being unable
to trade in favorable situations (i.e., when they have information indicating that the trade
would be profitable), which is not necessarily accurate. See Choi, supra note 152, at 567-68;
SEC Telephone Interpretation 15 (May 2001) (stating that insider may terminate plan while
in possession of material nonpublic information), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps
/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm. It also ignores the possibility that management may
alter the timing or quality of disclosure in order to earn extra market returns through Rule
10b5-1 plans. See Jagolinzer, supra note 453, at 3.
" That refraining from trading can be profitable recently made front page news. The
Wall Street Journal, reporting on Google's initial public offering, noted how at the last
minute as the offering price was being cut, seven of Google's directors lowered the number
of shares they or their institutions planned to sell. (The remaining two directors had not
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For example, say the investor who is subject to a confidentiality
agreement and planned to sell their stock learns positive material
nonpublic information. Although they cannot buy more stock, they no
longer decide to sell.'
Regulation FD also does not prevent trading in substitutes.9
Substitutes may be "the stock of that firm's rivals, suppliers, customers,
, 10
or the manufacturers of complementary products."' 0 A prominent
example of this was SBC's takeover of AT&T in early 2005. Even before
the parties announced the takeover, the shares of MCI, the only
comparable company to AT&T, increased . Investors believed, not
unreasonably, that, given the consolidation in the industry MCI, would
also become a takeover target. Investors, subject to a confidentiality
agreement and with advance notice of the SBC/AT&T transaction, could
trade and profit on that information simply by buying MCI stock.
In addition to the above situations, Regulation FD also appears
underinclusive when looking specifically at the SEC's third interest of
512preventing corruption of issuer or analyst . First, even with a
confidentiality agreement, material nonpublic information may still have
value for an analyst or investor and thus still be useful as a bribe. As
noted above, for the investor, refraining from trading or trading in
planned any sales.) In the 13 months since the IPO, Google stock has increased 256%. The
directors "were in a privileged position to guess the stock's future trajectory," including
perhaps information about the company's "spectacular" third quarter that other investors
would not have known about. See Kevin J. Delaney, Google IPO Revisited: Insiders Got
Choice Other Sellers Didn't, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at Al.
' Professor Choi notes how the investor and management may collude. Choi, supra
note 152, at 568. The investor indicates to management their trading intentions, which if
likely to be profitable, are greeted with silence, but if likely to be unprofitable, are greeted
with the selective disclosure of information. In the former case he has not derived any
information advantage from selective disclosure, and in the latter case he must refrain from
continuing with his unprofitable trade. Id.
' More technically, Regulation FD would appear only to prevent trading in substitutes
if the confidentiality agreement between the company and the enumerated person so
specified.
510 See Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235, 235
(2001); see also Choi, supra note 152, at 566.
51' See Ken Belson, MCI Widely Seen as Target of Next Round of Courtship, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2005, at C2 (noting that AT&T's attempt to sell itself is "worst-kept secret"); SBC Talks
With AT&T Could See Dollars 16bn Deal, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2005, at 30.
512 There is also a tension between the fiduciary's property rights in information
approach exemplified by O'Hagan and the approach in Regulation FD that prevents a
company from using its information for its own benefit. See Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) (stating that proposal is
intended to address issuers who "treat material information as a commodity"). See
generally Ribstein, supra note 16.
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substitutes is still possible. The analyst, likewise, has the opportunity to
refrain from changing her report or to alter reports for related
companies. In addition, the information (especially when combined
with selective disclosures from other issuers) may allow better general
predictions about the state of the economy or an industry sector. Second,
since an issuer can comply with Regulation FD by simultaneously
making an EDGAR filing that has the same date as the date of disclosure
to favored market professionals or investors, these favored parties can
still act on the information before it becomes readily available to the
market .
Despite its underinclusiveness, Regulation FD may actually be more
"unfair" to the individual investor than the previous status quo because
the investor is "punished" twice. For example, someone buying stock in
an issuer while a market professional's clients are selling based on the
issuer's selective disclosure of material nonpublic information may feel
aggrieved for two reasons. First, the perception that the market
professional's clients had an unearned information advantage may exist.
Second, the issuer may then have to pay a fine for violating Regulation
FD (thereby further reducing the value of the investor's investment),
while those who profited from the information, such as those to whom
the analyst recommended the sale of the issuer's stock, face no sanction
whatsoever.
Even assuming that the SEC's interests are substantial or compelling,
Regulation FD appears both fatally underinclusive and overinclusive at
the same time. There are also other less restrictive alternatives. The
courts should not uphold the SEC's choice to regulate speech rather than
actual securities trading, which is the source of the perceived underlying
harm.
CONCLUSION
More than seventy years ago, when Congress enacted the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, the First Amendment had not yet been
514
extended to protect commercial speech or the speech of corporations.
Similarly, the First Amendment had not yet been deployed to invalidate
laws compelling speech . 15 Recently, however, in the wake of decisions
513 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 14, at 1092 n.367 (explaining how this process appears to
be in compliance with Regulation FlD).
5" See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
"' The first compelled speech case was West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
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such as 44 Liquormart, Lorillard, and United Foods government regulations
restricting and compelling speech by corporations have received a
heightened intermediate scrutiny, even when the speech constituted
mere commercial advertising. 16
The SEC, however, "a juggernaut among regulatory agencies,
ignored this trend and chose to implement a new regulation, Regulation
FD, that solely targeted speech. Unlike nearly all other securities
regulations, Regulation FD does not require harmful conduct or even a
reasonable likelihood of harmful conduct . 18  In similar but distinct
fashion, Regulation FD operates as a burden on private speech to private
parties, again without requiring a showing of harm or likelihood of
harm.19
Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of Regulation FD is that the SEC
had other constitutional alternatives. It could have instead targeted
directly the conduct it perceived as harmful, trading securities on the
basis of inappropriately received information, as it had with its antifraud
Rule 10b-5. The SEC could have also sought additional power from
Congress to prevent the suspect trading activities.' 2°  Regulating the
trading of securities, unlike regulating speech, raises no constitutional
issues.
Regulation FD raises a substantial constitutional question. Has the
SEC, in targeting truthful, valuable speech, finally gone too far? 21 This
Article argues that it has and that the courts should reach the same
conclusion.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
516 See supra notes 309-17, 368-75 and accompanying text.
517 Joseph McLauglin, The SEC's Coming Regulatory Retreat, in SECURITIES LAW & THE
INTERNET: DOING BUsINEss IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKETPLACE 185,187 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. BO-OS, 1999).
51 See supra note 470-73 and accompanying text.
519 See supra notes 379-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 494-96 and accompanying text.
521 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding
that "FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe" in connection with striking down
on First Amendment grounds restrictions on encouraging off-label prescription of drugs).
[Vol. 39:001
